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INTRODUCTION

The United States has a drug problem-a drug problem that is
characterized by high rates of opiate overdose deaths' and a drug
problem to which people commonly refer as the "Opioid Epidemic."
The Opioid Epidemic has resulted in an increase in popular, political,
and scholarly focus on the ineffectiveness of the United States'
criminal justice, or punitive policy, approach2 to problem drug use. 3
The Opioid Epidemic has also led to an increased focus on the need
for U.S. policymakers to embrace a health approach' in addressing
1.
Opioid overdose deaths have been rising for at least 16 years, with the
number of deaths each year equaling a new historic high. See Opioid Overdose, CTRS.
FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

AND

PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2018).
2.
Although at times the criminal justice and punitive approach may seem
interchangeable, the criminal justice approach, by my definition, also includes
proposals to administer drug treatment through the criminal justice system. Some
may consider such mandatory treatment punitive, while others may argue that it is
still a health solution. Others would categorize it as a criminal-justice approach, as it
uses the criminal justice system to administer it.
3.
Throughout this paper, I use the term "problem drug use" to refer to any
drug use that interferes with the ability of the user to meet his or her societal,
educational, and occupational obligations. I adopt a similar conceptualization of
problem drug use as Anderson et al., in that I believe problem drug use is "habitual,
heavy consumption of something pleasurable." PETER ANDERSON ET AL., THE IMPACT
OF ADDICTIVE SUBSTANCES AND BEHAVIOURS ON INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL WELL-

BEING 38 (2015).
4.
Through the use of cluster analysis of components of European drug policy
systems, Ysa and colleagues identified three main approaches to drug policies: a
punitive approach, an assistantship approach, and a public health approach. TAMYKO
YSA ET AL., GOVERNANCE OF ADDICTIONS: EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICIES 3 (2014).

The assistantship approach treats problem drug use as a disease that necessitates
treatment. This is differentiated from a public health approach that emphasizes harm
reduction. See id. at 4-5. Throughout this Article, I use the term "health approach"
to characterize the U.S. drug policy system, which blends Ysa et al.'s assistantship
approach with some conservative public health solutions, including education,
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problem drug use,' an approach that emphasizes the prevention and
U.S. policymakers have responded by
treatment of addiction.
distancing themselves from blatant punitive policies of the past and
adopting health-oriented definitions of problem drug use that support
health-oriented policy proposals. 6
For example, under the Obama Administration, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP")7 advocated for a healthoriented definition of problem drug use, explicitly acknowledging
addiction as a chronic disease of the brain, advocating for reduced
sentences for persons convicted of possession of illicit substances for
personal use, and calling for a renewed focus on prevention and
treatment of addiction.' Congress has also demonstrated a willingness

expanding access to medication-assisted treatment ("MAT"), overdose-reversal
medications, and needle-exchange programs. Unfortunately, the support for public
health solutions in the U.S. is half-hearted. For example, the U.S. has alternated
between federal support for and banning of needle-exchange programs. Cf Syringe
Services

Programs,

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

AND

PREVENTION,

https//www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/ssps.html (last updated July 31, 2018). Even when
support for federal funding for needle-exchange programs has existed, federal law
only permits use of funds to staff the program and not to purchase the clean needles.
Id.
5.
The reasons that advocacy for a health approach has increased for the
Opioid Epidemic when it was absent from previous epidemics is beyond the scope of
this Article.
Admittedly the Trump administration's recent decision to rescind Obama6.
era policy and once again mobilize federal law enforcement agents to prosecute
possessors of marijuana, even in states that have chosen to decriminalize or legalize
certain recreational drug use leads one to wonder whether such receptiveness to the
public health approach will continue. See generally Memorandum of Jefferson B.
Sessions, III, U.S. Att'y Gen., Office of the Att'y Gen., to all U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 4,
2018), https//www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
ONDCP is a branch of the Executive Office of the President, the primary
7.
advisor to the President on drug control policy. Office of National Drug Control
Strategy, THfE WHITE HouSE, https//www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ (last visited Nov.
25, 2018).
8.

National

Drug

Control

Strategy,

THE

WHITE

HOUSE,

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndes (last visited
Nov. 24, 2018). President Obama also demonstrated his support for a health approach
over a criminal-justice approach by pardoning hundreds of drug users who had been
incarcerated for drug possession. See generally Office of the Pardon Att'y, Clemency
Recipients: Pardons Granted by PresidentBarack Obama (2009-2017), U.S. DEP'T
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to use the health approach to address the current Opioid Epidemic by
passing the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016
("CARA"), health-oriented legislation9 that Congress drafted and
enacted with nearly unanimous bipartisan supportIO and later funded
with equal legislative enthusiasm." In doing so, some members of
Congress explicitly supported the definition of "addiction" as a brain
disease, as opposed to a moral failing.1 2 And defining addiction as a
disease, instead of a moral failing, demands a health solution,1 3 not a
criminal justice solution.
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/obama-pardons (last updated Aug. 30,
2017).
There are provisions in CARA, however, that do not fit squarely within
9.
justice vs. health dichotomy. For example, CARA emphasizes the need
criminal
the
prescription monitoring programs to identify prescribers that may
to
develop
states
for
for
prescription drug diversion. Comprehensive Addiction and
responsible
be
Pub. L. No. 114-198, § 601, 130 Stat. 695, 732 (codified at 42
2016,
Act
of
Recovery
(2012)). Law enforcement would then have access to these
290ee-3(b)(2)(B)
§
U.S.C.
and use the intelligence it provides to criminally
systems
monitoring
prescription
CODE ANN. § 53-10-306(a)(9) (2018). Such a
e.g.,
TENN.
See,
prescribers.
prosecute
to
the
demand-side focus typically accompanying a
counter
solution
runs
supply-side
approach.
health
CARA passed with a 92-2 vote in the Senate and a 407-5 vote in the
10.
House. See S.524 - Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of2016: All Actions,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/524/allCONGRESS.GOV,
actions?overview--closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D (last
visited Nov. 25, 2018).
The 21st Century Cures Act built on CARA by providing an additional $1
11.
billion of funding over two years. The 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255,
§ 1003(b)(2)(A), 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
12.
See e.g., Press Release, Rob Portman, Portman, Whitehouse, Ayotte,
Klobuchar Cheer Final Passage of Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (July
30, 2016) ("This is also the first time we've treated addiction like the disease that it
is, which will help put an end to the stigma that has surrounded addiction for too
http//www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfin/2016/7/portmanlong."),
whitehouse-ayotte-klobuchar-cheer-final-passage-of-comprehensive-addiction-andrecovery-act.
l use the term "solutions" throughout this manuscript to refer to legislative
13.
or administrative policy alternatives or proposals. Although such proposals rarely
solve a policy problem in its entirety, policymakers propose them with the hopes that
they are at least partial solutions to the problem. See generally DEBORAH A. STONE,
POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 184-206 (1988) (discussing rational
choice theory). Punitive solutions are those that apply a penalty to a behavior in order
to punish and deter the behavior. See YSA ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4. In the arena
OF JUSTICE,
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The increased public and political attention on the issue of drug
and
the supportive political climate for a health approach to the
use
Opioid Epidemic have created a window of opportunityl 4 for legal
scholars, professionals, researchers, and other concerned citizens to
pressure legislatures and administrative agencies to shift their focus
from criminal justice strategies to public health strategies. Such
strategies emphasize harm reduction,' 5 access to quality treatment, and
the amelioration of the socio-economic risk factors that increase the
likelihood of problem drug use. 1 6
To effect such a policy change, however, scholars must
understand the problem-definition process and the role that groups
play in redefining a problem. Problem definition is the part of the
policymaking process during which actors within the political sphere
of drug policy, supply-side solutions are those focused on decreasing the drug supply
and typically involve controlling domestic sale of the drug as well as disrupting the
supply from the country of origin. Id. at 17. Demand-side solutions, on the other
hand, decrease the demand for the drug typically through treatment and prevention
efforts. Id.
Dr. Kingdon argues that, for an issue to make it to the political agenda,
14.
there must be a window of opportunity that occurs when three streams align: the
problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream. See generally JOHN W.
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165-95 (2d ed. 2003).

The problem stream includes social issues that may or may not currently be on the
public's agenda. See generally id at 90-115. The policy stream includes policy
proposals, or as I refer to them throughout this paper, policy solutions. See generally
id at 121-31. The politics stream refers to the political environment. See generally
id at 145-64. Often there are champions of particular problem definitions in the
problem stream, or policy proposals in the policy stream, who lay in wait for all three
streams to align so that they can take advantage of the window of opportunity to place
their issue and/or solution on the political agenda. See generally id at 175-83.
Harm reduction approaches focus on reducing the social, economic, and
15.
health harms of drug use, as opposed to focusing on user abstinence. YSA ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 5-6. Analysts measure success by the reduction of these harms, as
opposed to abstinence of drug use. Id. at 5-6. For examples of harm reduction
policies used by European nations, see id at 34-35, 42-43.
16.
The public health approach to improving access to treatment includes not
only ensuring that there are enough treatment providers to provide the care, but also
that the individual has transportation to get to appointments, the appointments are
available during non-work hours, and the individual has the ability to pay for care.
See generally Access to Health Services, OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH
PROMOTION, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/Accessto-Health-Services.
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characterize what causes a problem and what alternative solutions
policymakers should use to address the problem.17 A rhetorical tool
that policy actors commonly use to persuade others in the problem
definition process is the "causal narrative," a story that identifies the
cause of the policy problem, assigns benefits and blame, and limits the
alternative policy solutions.1 Because policy actors may use different
causal stories to define the same social problem, narratives battle to be
accepted as the dominant causal story. It is this precise battle between
19
narratives that is at the heart of the political policymaking process.
Narrators, including pressure groups, organized interest groups,2 0 and
administrative agencies (collectively, "pressure groups") compete for
2
the opportunity to contribute a problem definition to the discourse. 1
Each narrator hopes that their problem definition will become the
dominant problem definition, 2 2 because the group that dominates the
problem definition discourse has the power to limit the alternative
solutions available to a policy problem. 23
Although some scholars and researchers may view the
involvement of pressure groups in the policymaking process as a threat
to the development of evidence-based policy, our Founding Fathers
chose to design a government that permits, and even encourages,
"majoritarian pluralism."2 4 This mode of governing encourages
policymakers to consider the preferences of groups that represent the
interests of factions of its citizenry.25 Policymaking in such a system
17.

THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION: SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA

3-

4 (David A. Rochefort & Roger W. Cobb eds., 1994).
See STONE, supra note 13, at 148-54.
18.
See id.
19.
Organized interest groups include citizen groups, trade and business
20.
associations, business corporations, professional associations, coalitions on specific
issues, unions, foundations and think tanks, governmental associations, and
institutions and associations of institutions.
Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 17, at 8; see STONE, supra note 13, at 153.
21.
22.

See id.

23.

Cf E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 68 (1960) ("He

who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the
alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power.").
Cf., e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("Ambition must be
24
made to counteract ambition.").
Majoritarian pluralism can be traced back to James Madison's essay in The
25.
FederalistNo. 10, in which he referred to diverse "factions" representing the interests
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does not exclude experts from the policymaking process. Scholars,
researchers, and professionals can affect policy change even when
policymakers do not call on them individually for expert testimony.
These experts can effect change by mobilizing in groups and
contributing to the problem definition discourse by: pressuring groups
of which they are a member to adopt a new causal narrative; swaying
the public to adopt their desired causal stories; calling upon group
members to pressure legislators to adopt their narrative through the use
of strategically crafted emails, letters, and phone calls; and promoting
their narratives at town halls or Congressional field hearings.
This Article purports to equip legal scholars, researchers, and
all concerned citizens with a greater understanding of the legislative
problem-definition process and the role that pressure groups play in
such a process. Through the use of examples from drug policy history,
this Article demonstrates how pressure groups strategically used
problem definitions to shape legislative discourse and pressure
Congress into supporting policy solutions that aligned with their
problem definitions by, for example, sometimes attributing addiction
to disease, and to deviancy at other times. By example, this Article
outlines strategies that legal scholars, researchers, and concerned
citizens can use to define problem drug use as a health issue caused by
multiple sociological, psychological, economic, and biological factors.
Part II provides readers with an introduction to the problemdefinition and policy-narrative literature, starting with a general
background on its philosophical roots, and then explaining how policy
actors use narratives to influence the problem definition process. Part
III then provides evidence to support the claim that pressure groups
affect the legislative decisionmaking process, primarily through
subject-matter expertise that they provide to legislators. Part IV
of groups of citizens. Although some scholars believe that "factions" could have
referenced both parties and organized interest groups, I would argue that Madison's
use of the word "parties" just a few paragraphs before his definition of factions
implies that he intended for factions to refer to interest groups. See e.g., Martin Gilens
& Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories ofAmerican Politics:Elites, Interest Groups,
and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 564, 566 (2014) (arguing that
factions could have referenced both parties and interest groups). "By a faction,"
Madison writes, "I understand a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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explains, by use of both hypothetical and historical examples, how
groups construct narratives. This Part is by no means a complete
historic account of all instances in which lobbying groups effectively
used narratives to further their objectives, nor is it a complete history
of drug policy in the U.S. Rather, I focus on time periods during which
the health vs. criminal-justice narrative battle dominated policy
discourse. Part V highlights pivotal times in early American drug
policy during which pressure groups defined or redefined problem
drug use as either a health problem or a criminal justice problem.
Finally, Part VI concludes with lessons from our studies of pressure
groups' narrative uses and outlines recommendations for problem
definition strategies that legal scholars and professionals can use to
further their policy objectives in drug policy debates and beyond.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION & POLICY NARRATIVES
Problem-definition theory is rooted in the epistemological
belief of social constructivism, which theorizes that society makes
sense of the world around it through shared interpretation and
meaning. 26 The "Truth," or absolute reality, may or may not exist; but
rather than focusing on compiling evidence or facts that attempt to
represent this absolute reality, 2 7 the constructivist focuses on
uncovering how society interprets reality. Such an interpretation and
assignment of meaning is what influences societal values, beliefs,
actions, and inaction. 28 Policymaking thus becomes "a struggle over
alternative realities."

26.

29

Epistemology generally refers to theories of knowledge gathering or

philosophy of knowledge. FRANK FISCHER, REFRAMING PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE
POLITICS AND DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES 12 n.10 (2012).

Such a knowledge-seeking expedition runs counter to the mainstream
27.
scientific philosophy referred to as positivism, or its more modem counterpart
postpositivism, which posits that there is an objective reality that we are trying to
measure. Id. at 12 n. 11. Within this model, the observer stands at an arm's length,
with a validated measuring stick, and a statistical arsenal with the objective of proving
or disproving a hypothetical truth in the form of a hypothesis. Id. at 118.
28.
29.

See id. at 123.
Rochefort & Cobb, supra note 17, at 9.
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Problem-definition 30 scholars apply this knowledge-seeking
theory to studying how the political process defines social problems.3 1
Problem definition theorists believe that people contest and debate the
problem in the political sphere based on their perceptions of what the
problem is, but one can always contest these perceptions.32 1 Will
demonstrate this to be true in the arena of drug policy through
examples of competing problem definitions at different junctures in
history.

Accepting that problem definitions are contestable is not to say
that they are not at all grounded in evidence. Rather, it is an
acknowledgement that other factors aside from research contribute to
the manner in which society defines problems, including "[c]ultural

values, interest group advocacy, scientific information, and
professional advice." 3 3 People use evidence, facts, and scientific
studies to justify or support a narrative.

Often, however, problem-

definition narrators choose the evidence selectively, giving preference
to evidence that supports their preferred causal narrative, while
discounting, omitting, or ignoring conflicting evidence.34

Although different tools are used in the problem-definition
process, I will focus on the use of policy narratives or stories, as well

&

30.
Problem definition has different names, depending on the discipline:
"problem framing" or "frames" in sociology, communication, and political science,
or "policy narratives" in the narrative literature of policy studies. Cf., e.g., Rochefort
& Cobb, supra note 17. But see, e.g., David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology,
FrameResonance and ParticipantMobilization, 1 INT'L Soc. MOVEMENT REs. 197,
197-218 (1988) (discussing aspects of social movements that some disciplines fail to
analyze). Because "framing" refers to a variety of constructs, I will use "problem
definition" throughout this Article to refer to the act of defining a social problem, with
the caveat that different disciplines refer to the same construct by different names.
31.
Social problems are a "shared understanding of some problematic
condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding
who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others
to act in concert to affect change." Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing
Processesand Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANNUAL REV. OF
SOCIOLOGY 611, 615 (2000). A social problem differs from a policy problem because
a social problem does not become a policy problem until it "gains attention and
legitimacy" and lends itself to an "official programmatic response." Rochefort
Cobb, supra note 17, at 8.
32.

Id.

33.
34.

Id. at 4.
See generally id. at 15-24; STONE, supra note 13, at 133-37.
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35
as the use of synecdoche in these narratives. Policy narratives "are a
way of structuring and communicating our understanding of the
world." 3 6 They resemble fictional narratives in that they have
37
characters, a plotline, an ending, and a relatively consistent structure.
Unlike fictional narratives, however, policy narratives require a higher
standard of believability, and society judges them as real depending on
how believable or credible they appear to be. 3 Narrators can gain
39
credibility through the use of experts or with scientific evidence.
Believability, however, depends on the degree to which the narrative
0
resonates with cultural and societal norms,4 the familiarity of the
plotline,4 1 and the degree to which the character descriptions coincide
with the audiences' perceptions of that character from their life
experiences and encounters. 4 2 Many of these recycled plotlines apply
to different social problems over time, especially because familiar
policy narratives tend to be more convincing to legislatures,
administrative officials, and the public.4 3 These policy narratives are
important in that they affect perceptions of the trade-offs between
policy alternatives 4" and the content of legislation.
The causal story is a common type of narrative in the
policymaking sphere. Causal stories describe the cause of the problem,

There is disagreement in the policy narrative literature on whether policy
35.
narratives and policy stories are the same construct. See, e.g., SHAUL R. SHENHAV,
ANALYZING SOCIAL NARRATIVES 20-36 (2015) (analyzing "stories" as constituent
parts of "narratives"). However, I use the terms interchangeably in this Article.
Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Michael D. Jones & Mark K. McBeth, Policy
36.
Narrativesand Policy Processes, 39 POL'Y STUD. J. 535, 539 (2011).
STONE, supra note 13, at 109. See also generally SHENHAV, supra note 35
37.
(outlining the structure and use of social narratives).
FISCHER, supra note 26, at 177-78.
38.
Id.; see also ANNE LARASON SCHNEIDER & HELEN INGRAM, POLICY
39.
DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY

34-38 (1997) (analyzing the virtues and vices of "policy

science").
See generally Isaac William Martin, Redistributing Toward the Rich:
40.
Strategic Policy Craftingin the Campaign to Repeal the Sixteenth Amendment, 19381958, 116 AM. J. Soc. 1 (2010) (explaining the use of policy crafting and reviewing
sociological theory in connection with the politics of redistribution).
For examples of common plotlines, see STONE, supra note 13, at 166-72.
41.
FISCHER, supra note 26, at 177.
42.
See STONE, supra note 13, at 166-72.
43.
Martin, supra note 40, at 6-7.
44.
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assign blame, and suggest burden and benefit allocations depending in
part on the blame assignment and the social construction of the target
population45 that the policy solution affects.4 6
These stories often identify the actors of the story as either
heroes or villains, innocent or guilty, or strong or weak, and they
describe the cause of the phenomenon as action or inaction by these
characters. 4 7 Narrators in the policymaking discourse then use the
causal stories, or causal narratives, as tools of persuasion.
The narrators, or storytellers, in the policymaking process can
include, but are not limited to, the president, administrative officials,
legislators, judges, and organized interest groups. The president uses
the bully pulpit to communicate causal narratives that justify his focus
on an issue in his presidential agenda and to garner public support for
his initiatives. 48 Administrative agency officials use causal stories to
convince the president and the legislature that a social issue within
their subject-matter expertise is a policy problem that the president and
Congress should prioritize. 49 Administrative officials also use causal
stories to justify rules and regulations that they promulgate in carrying
out their duties of enforcement and implementation of legislation.o
45.
In general, "the social construction of target populations refers to the
cultural characterizations or popular images of the persons or groups whose behavior
and well-being are affected by public policy." Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram,
Social Construction of Target Populations:Implicationsfor Politics and Policy, 87
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 334, 334 (1993).
46.
See STONE, supra note 13, at 154-65; Schneider & Ingram, supra note 45.
47.
Anne L. Schneider, Helen Ingram & Peter deLeon, Social Construction
and Policy Design, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 105, 105 (Paul A. Sabatier
& Christopher M. Weible eds., 3d ed. 2014); STONE, supra note 13, at 109.
48.
Presidents have a long, documented history of using causal narratives, as
well as other rhetorical devices, to mobilize the public to support efforts to address
the nation's drug problems. Often they have used such rhetoric to increase election
or re-election prospects.
See generally, e.g., ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF
YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE

WAR ON DRUGS (2009) (detailing how presidents use narratives and rhetoric to further
their policy goals).
49.
See infra Section IIIB for examples of narrative use by the Narcotics
Bureau to justify the war on drugs and the need to continue its efforts in addressing
the drug problem using a law enforcement approach.
50.
For example, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the Social Security
Administration supported the causal narrative that addiction was a disorder that
resulted in a disability. See Max Selver, Note, Disability Benefits and Addiction:
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Legislators also use causal stories to persuade colleagues to adopt
certain legislative solutions and garner constituent support on issues
Organized interest groups use causal stories to
and proposals."
persuade legislators and administrative officials both to adopt
52
legislative and regulatory proposals that benefit their members. Even
53
judges use causal stories to justify their interpretations of the law.
Although multiple actors are involved in the narrative discourse, I
focus in this Article on the manner in which pressure groups participate
in the legislative narrative discourse and affect legislative solutions. In
order to do so, I begin by presenting evidence that supports the
contention that pressure groups influence legislative decision-making
and then theorize how they use narratives to do so.
III. PRESSURE GROUPS & LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE
54
Organized interest groups battle for legislators' time and
attention so that they can have the opportunity to define problems that
affect their members. 5 Administrative agencies also engage in the

Resolving an Uncertain Burden, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 954, 988 (2016). This
interpretation allowed individuals with addiction to qualify for Social Security
Income benefits. Id.
For example, in advocating for the passage of CARA, Senator Robert
51.
Portman defined addiction as a chronic disease ofthe brain. See Portman,supra note
12.
See, e.g., Section IV.D (discussing how the Parents Group's use of causal
52.
narratives to shift government focus and resources to protecting their children from
the temptations of marijuana).
See, e.g., Daniel Polisar & Aaron Wildavsky, From Individuals to System
53.
Blame: A Cultural Analysis of HistoricalChange in the Law of Torts, 1 J. OF POL'Y
HIST. 129, 131-40 (1989) (chronicling how judges defined the problems presented in
tort litigation differently over time to accommodating changing public and cultural
views on who should be blamed and benefited by tort litigation).
See generally Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign
54.
Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field
Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. Sci. 545 (2016).
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO
55.
WINs, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 9-15 (2009); SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at

3-5 ("Criticisms of government in the United States center around governance-the
capacity of a democracy to produce public policy that meets the expectations of
society . . . ."). See also generally, e.g., JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS:
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legislative problem-definition process by issuing government reports
that outline the cause and scope of public problems5 6 and by testifying
in front of Congress." By defining the problem, pressure groups can
influence legislative outcomes. 8 Although throughout this paper I
often refer to both organized interests and administrative agencies
collectively as pressure groups, I will review the evidence for
organized interest group and administrative agency influence on
legislative decision-making separately, because the political science
literature often treats these two groups separately in their analysis.

CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY 1919-1981, at 227 (1991); Richard L. Hasen,
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REv. 191, 219 (2012).
56.
In the arena of drug policy, government reports have been very influential
in focusing the public's attention on the nation's drug problem and enumerating the
magnitude of the problem, usually through reports of increases in the number of
persons using illicit substances, persons addicted to illicit substances, or persons
overdosing from illicit substances. In Gozenbach's analysis of 15 years of American
drug policy, the attention cycle for each episode of nationwide problem drug use
began with a federal agency releasing a report publicizing an increase in drug use,
after which the media began covering the nation's drug problem, and then public
concern over the nation's drug problem also increased. WILLIAM J. GONZENBACH,
THE MEDIA, THE PRESIDENT, AND PUBLIC OPINION: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF

THE DRUG ISSUE, 1984-1991, at 93-100 (1996).
Public attention would fade,
however, even if the problem drug use remained at the same rate. Id. It was not until
a government agency released another report that the media, and then the public,
would once again pay attention to problem drug use. Id. The order in which this
occurred suggests that government reports shape the media's perception of drug
problems.
57.
Harry Anslinger was famous for his fiery testimony in front of Congress
on drug issues while he was director of the Narcotics Bureau; he preached fire and
brimstone for the deviants who used and sold drugs, and lawmakers deferred to his
judgment. See generally DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF
OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA 61-77 (2001) (discussing 19th century popular
attitudes toward opium users and their attendant social troubles); id. at 138
("Anslinger initially endorsed the psychopathy view [of drug addicts]."). See also id.
at 156 (describing Anslinger's congressional testimony and Capitol Hill politicking
related to federal criminal drug laws then under consideration); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 225 (3d ed. 1999).

58.
Cf SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 172 ("There are many other
examples of how members of Congress have sidestepped public debates over values
by adopting narrow, scientific definitions of problems."); Mark K. McBeth et al., The
Intersection ofNarrativePolicy Analysis and Policy Change Theory, 35 POL'Y STUD.
J. 87, 87-104 (2007).
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OrganizedInterests'Influenceon Legislators

Researchers have long hypothesized that organized interests
influence legislative decision-making by providing legislators with
financial contributions. 59 Politicians need such campaign funds to pay
for advertisements, among other costs, that increase the likelihood that
voters will elect the candidate.6 0 It reasonably follows that legislators
may pay special attention to interest groups that donate to their
campaign." As logical as such a deduction may be, the empirical
literature, to date, has not been able to find a consistent relationship
between campaign contributions and policy outcomes. 6 2 Researchers,
however, have found that legislators are more likely to meet with
groups that donate to their campaign. 63 This indicates that what groups
might be buying with their campaign contributions is not necessarily a
legislative outcome, but a legislator's time.' Getting some focused
time and attention from a legislator allows the group to use that time

See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and
59.
InstitutionalPower, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1673, 1673-78 (1999); Brandice Canes-Wrone,
From Mass Preferences to Policy, 18 ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 147, 152, 155-56 (2015);
Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions
and Committee Access, 78 J. POL. 974, 976 (2016);.
Kalla & Broockman, supra note 54, at 546.
60.
See Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy
61.
and the Policy Preferences of the Wealthy, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 66-68 (2013)
(describing wealthy individuals' engagement of the political process and how their
participation influences outcomes). Scholars have also hypothesized that legislators
pay special attention to campaign contributors that donate to other legislators'
campaigns in the hopes that these donors will donate funds to their campaign in the
future. Kalla & Broockman, supra note 54, at 546.
See generally Beth L. Leech, Lobbying and Influence, in THE OXFORD
62.
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROuPS 534, 534-51 (L.

Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010). Political scientists also hypothesize
that organized interests are influential because they have information on the
preferences of their members and can mobilize their members to vote for a legislator.
Id. at 545-46. However, the empirical evidence justifying such a claim is weak. See
e.g., id. at 546 (finding that interest groups used arguments that were "electoral in
nature" only 3% of the time).
Kalla & Broockman, supra note 54, at 546.
63.
64.

See id. at 547.
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to define policy problems and try to narrow policy solutions. 6 5 In sum,
the body of research suggests that, although campaign finance may
influence legislative outcomes, it does not provide a reliable predictor
of how or why interest groups seek to influence legislators' decisionmaking processes.
Interests groups, however, have other resources that they can
provide to legislators, aside from dollars and votes-resources that
may allow them to otherwise influence legislative decision-making.
Interest groups offer subject-matter expertise and specialized
information that allow legislators to make informed decisions on issues
without incurring direct information costs themselves. 6 6 Additionally,
advocacy or citizens groups can publish reports on an issue that the
public and media find trustworthy and convincing. 67 If such a report
aligns with a legislator's narrative on an issue, the report provides
external validity to his or her claims.6 8 It is when groups offer this
"legislative subsidy" that they are in a prime position to use their
research and subject matter expertise to justify a particular problem
definition. 6 9
Id. Leech also notes that interest groups may use their influence to affect
65.
which issues get on the political agenda. Leech, supra note 62, at 546. For a
legislative outcome to be possible, an issue must first get on the political agenda and
be deemed worthy of attention by legislators. Id. at 549. Conversely, then, by
preventing issues from ever getting on the political agenda in the first place, groups
can block legislation from being introduced on the issue. See id. It is difficult to
measure how many issues do not make it on the agenda and why they do not make it
on the agenda, so most research on interest group influence has focused on counting
yes or no votes on legislation that has made it through the many hurdles necessary to
reach a floor vote. Id. at 546.
66.
Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorf, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,
100 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 69, 69, 71 (2006).
The public and media do not have as easy access to industry reports as they
67.
do citizens' groups' reports. Cf JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE
RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS 121-27, 133-42 (1999) (discussing the
overrepresentation of citizens' interest groups in nightly television news coverage as
a function of the research reports that they generate and the incentives they have to
create them); WILLIAM P. BROWNE, CULTIVATING CONGRESS: CONSTrrUENTS, ISSUES,
AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING 110-11 (1995) (describing

congressional constituents as the "primary informants" of policy problems).
See Hall & Deardorff, supra note 66, at 72.
68.
69.
Hall & Deardorff coined the term "legislative subsidy" to refer to the
specialized information that organized interest groups can provide to legislators, so
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B. AdministrativeAgency Influence on Legislators
Federal, state, and local administrative agencies are another
source of specialized information for legislators. These agencies are
often privy to data and statistics that measure the type, scope, and cause
of a problem. 0 Since legislatures charge administrative agencies with
the implementation and enforcement of legislation, the agencies'
technical expertise on the logistics of policy implementation can be
valuable in ensuring that legislators minimize the unintended
consequences of legislative proposals. 71 Further, administrative
agency officials are powerful allies for organized interest groups in
successfully redefining a policy issue. 72
Historically, federal administrative agencies have been
especially influential in defining problem drug use and focusing the
national attention on America's drug problem via agency reports on
problem drug use.73
Federal administrative agencies, like the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency ("SAMHSA")
and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), collect
yearly data on variables that government researchers consider to be

that legislators do not have to expend costs in acquiring this information themselves.
Id. at 72-76.
70.
Cf United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1977) (holding that agencies must disclose scientific research they use in rulemaking
so interested parties have an opportunity to comment on it or provide their own to
address specific policy concerns).
71.
While it is true that, traditionally, only federal agencies were the sole
enforcers of federal law, with the expansion of Congressional delegation of authority
and duties to the federal bureaucracy has come the subsequent delegation of
enforcement to state and local governments. Cf Mark K. McBeth et al., The
Intersection ofNarrativePolicy Analysis andPolicy Change Theory, 35 POL'Y STUD.
J. 87, 93 (2007) (describing joint efforts of the National Park Service and the Montana
State Livestock Department to control bison population). Typically, this occurs
through the use of conditional federal funding for state programs. Cf generally
BRiAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44797, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
AUTHORiTY TO IMPOSE CONDrTIONS ON GRANT FUNDS (2017).
72.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 55, at 13-15 (finding that support for a
narrative by high ranking governmental officials in either the legislature or the
administration best predicted whether or not a problem was successfully redefined).
See also Part IV where I demonstrate how parents' groups partnered with NIDA to
affect the definition of problem drug use in the late 1970s and 1980s.
73.
See supra notes 4-7.
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measures of problem drug use. 74 These data allow these agencies to
monitor any changes in the variables from year to year and alert
Congress of any increases in rates of use, addiction, or overdose
deaths.
Although the inclination is to treat such reports as objective
research, it is important to acknowledge that agencies have a stake in
results that they publish. On one hand, highlighting the severity of a
problem through numbers and statistics increases focus on the
agency's problem of interest and supports requests for additional
funding allocations to that agency. On the other hand, continually
having increasing rates of death or addiction can demonstrate that the
agency is ineffectively handling the problem. For example, the Bureau
of Narcotics, the predecessor to the federal Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA"), knowingly overestimated the number of persons addicted to
illicit drugs to justify continued budget allocations and ensure the
Bureau's survival.76
To demonstrate that it was effective and
producing results, however, the Bureau of Narcotics balanced its
reports of escalating problems with reports of decreases in addiction
or, more often, increases in the number of arrests of drug traffickers
and users.7 7
This is not to say that doctoring statistics is the only way
agencies have influenced narratives in drug policy. Agencies can steer
the narrative discourse simply by making decisions on what to count
and how to define the categories that they are counting.7 8 For example,
agencies must decide questions of categorical inclusion like, when
counting the number of persons abusing prescription opioids, should
74.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., SAMHSA Data and

Dissemination,

SUBSTANCE

ABUSE

&

MENTAL

HEALTH

SERVS.

ADMIN.,

https://www.samhsa.gov/data/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
&

75.
See, e.g., JONAKI BOSE ET AL., SAMSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
HUMAN SERVS., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE
UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2015 NATIONAL SURvEY ON DRUG USE AND

HEALTH (2016), httpsl/www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR12015/NSDUH-FFR1-2015/NSDUH-FFR1-2015.pdf.
76.
See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at xii.
77.
Id.; see also id at 155-57; Joseph F. Spillane, Building a Drug Control
Regime, 1919-1930, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND

PRACTICE 25, 32, 43-47 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Spillane, Drug ControlRegime].
78.
STONE, supranote 13, at 133-37.
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the law consider doubling the prescribed dose of one's own
prescription to eliminate pain a form of problem drug use? 79 What
criteria should policymakers use to determine whether an accidental
overdose caused death relative to an intentional suicide by overdose?
Decisions on each of these measurement questions cannot only result
in the over- or undercounting of a problem but can change the meaning
of the results and how policymakers define the problem. so Further,
since the rational decision-making model of policy prefers measurable
policy outcomes, policy actors may prefer policy solutions that
produce outcomes that can be easily measured using pre-existing
measurement tools" over policy solutions that produce outcomes that
cannot be as easily measured, due to the outcomes' complexity or the
lack of a widely implemented measurement tool.82 In deciding what
to measure, what to report, or how to report it to legislators,
influence the narrative discourse.
administrative agencies
Additionally, they influence the discourse by explicitly supporting
some narratives over others.
In conclusion, evidence exists in the empirical literature to
support the claim that both organized interest groups and
administrative agencies can influence the manner in which lawmakers
define a problem, and that such problem definition can limit the policy

79.

See, e.g., Arthur Hughes et al., PrescriptionDrug Use and Misuse in the

United States, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Sept. 2016),

https//www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR2-2015/NSDUHFFR2-2015.htm (demonstrating that measuring a phenomenon involves decisions
about how to define and categorize, which in turn affect the results).

80.

Id.

&

81.
For example, since the CDC monitors overdose deaths, increasing the
availability of Naloxone, an overdose-reversal medication, is a policy solution whose
outcome can be easily measured by counting the number of overdoses before
implementing the policy solution and then determining if a decrease follows
implementation. See CDC WONDER Database,CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION, https//wonder.cdc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018) (database for
monitoring overdose deaths); Opioid Overdose Reversal with Naloxone (Narcan,
Evzio), NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (2018), https//www.drugabuse.gov/relatedtopics/opioid-overdose-reversal-naloxone-narcan-evzio (last updated Nov. 27, 2018)
(providing information on naloxone).
82.
For example, if the lack of hope for a better future is what causes overdose
epidemics, it is much more difficult to measure "hope." Further, no annual
administrative agency survey even attempts to measure "hope."
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alternatives available for inclusion into legislation. The next Part
outlines how groups construct narratives, and how that may differ
based on their motivations for doing so.
IV. How GROUPS CONSTRUCT NARRATIVES

The narrative-generation process is not always a conscious
endeavor. Why a group constructs a narrative in the first place,
however, influences how a group constructs its narrative. Is the group
constructing a narrative to achieve or avoid a policy solution? Are they
constructing a narrative to garner widespread acceptance of a
particular causal theory? Or are they developing a narrative to ensure
that a specific population benefits from or carries the burden of the
policy solution? Since a group can begin the narrative-construction
process by choosing its characters, cause, or desired solution, the
group's objective influences its decision as to which component to
focus its attention. The order in which groups select these components
varies, and choices at each juncture affect the alternatives that are
available for the remaining story elements. If the group makes certain
choices purposefully, then it can narrow the available alternatives to
those that align with the narrators' interests.
A.

Designinga Narrativeto Furthera Solution

A narrator may begin the narrative-crafting process by first
choosing a desired solution. For example, the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML"), a group that
advocates for the legalization of marijuana,8 3 could hypothetically see
the Opioid Epidemic and the shift in public support for
decriminalization 84 as a window of opportunity through which to
83.

See generally THE NAT'L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS,

httpJ/norml.org/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
84.
In February of 2017, Representative Thomas Garrett introduced the
Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2017. H.R. 1227, 115th Cong. (2017).
In August of 2017, Senator Cory Booker proposed the Marijuana Justice Act of 2017,
which would amend the Controlled Substances Act to remove marijuana from the
schedule list. S. 1689, 115th Cong. (2017). There has also been a movement at the
state level to decriminalize and legalize marijuana. See generally State Medical
Marijuana Laws,

NAT'L

CONFERENCE

OF LEGISLATURES

(Nov.

http//www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.

8,
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pursue its agenda. 5 As such, if NORML constructed a policy narrative
to define the Opioid Epidemic, they could start the narrative-formation
process by choosing their desired solution (marijuana legalization) and
then developing a cause of the Opioid Epidemic that at least makes
medical marijuana legalization a likely solution. Perhaps NORML
might argue that the Opioid Epidemic resulted from physicians relying
on opioid prescription pain pills as the primary treatment for chronic
pain because opioids were the only treatment option available in their
medical arsenal." The lack of alternative treatment options resulted in
the over prescription of "highly addictive"8 7 opioid prescription pain
pills. 8 8 Legalizing marijuana for medicinal use offers a solution to the
problem, as NORML might define it, because patients can use
marijuana as an alternative pain treatment to "overly addictive" 89 and
overdose-causing prescription pain pills. Evidence indeed supports

-

Furthermore, a majority of Americans (61%) support the legalization of marijuana.
Hanna Hartig & Abigail Geiger, About Six-in-Ten Americans Support Marijuana
Legalization, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), http//www.pewresearch.org/factThese factors suggest
tank/2018/01/05/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/.
that the politics stream in Kingdon's model may be aligned for the solution of
marijuana legalization. Cf KINGDON, supra note 14 at 146-49 (discussing how the
"national mood" in a given moment can spur policy change).
85.
See supra note 20.
86.
NORML advances such a narrative when contributing to the public
discourse. See Relationship Between Marijuanaand Opioids, THE NAT'L ORG. FOR
LAWS,
http://norml.org/marijuana/factTHE
REFORM
OF
MARIJUANA
sheets/item/relationship-between-marijuana-and-opioids (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
87.
I use quotation marks here to indicate that I refer to the pervasive opinion
that opioid prescription pain pills are highly addictive and am in no way indicating
that such a claim is supported by the weight of the evidence.
88.
There is empirical support for these claims. See generally, e.g., Lauren S.
Penney et al., Provider and Patient Perspectives on Opioids and Alternative
Treatmentsfor Managing Chronic Pain: A Qualitative Study, 17 BMC FAM. PRAC.
164 (2016).
See Relationship Between Marijuana and Opioids, supra note 86
89.
(attributing a decrease in opioid prescription rates to state implementation of medical
Although some have called opioid prescription pain pills
marijuana laws).
"extremely" addictive, the rate of iatrogenic addiction-addiction caused by medical
mistake-is often overestimated because addiction, abuse, misuse, and dependence
are all treated as if they are the same construct when they are in fact very different.
See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow & A. Thomas McLellan, OpioidAbuse in ChronicPain
Misconceptions and Mitigation Strategies, 374 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1253, 1259

(2016).
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these hypothetical claims, and would thus lend credibility to
NORML's narrative. For instance, physicians have cited the lack of
alternative pain treatment options for chronic pain patients as an issue
in care. 90 Additionally, empirical research has shown that cannabis
can effectively treat pain for some patients. 9 1
This is not the only causal theory with empirical support. For
example, despair, 9 2 unemployment, 93 or self-medication 94 could also
serve as causes of the Opioid Epidemic in an effective narrative. If
NORML focused on these other causes in their causal story, however,
marijuana legalization no longer neatly addresses the policy problem.
By starting with their desired solution, NORML members can limit the
list of causes to those that call for legalization of at least some forms
of marijuana use. Similarly, they would limit the characters or target
population of their narrative to persons with chronic pain, thus
excluding persons with problem drug use who do not have a chronic
pain diagnosis. 95 The consequences of such a limitation on the target

90.
See, e.g., Howard L. Fields, The Doctor's Dilemma: Opiate Analgesics
and ChronicPain, 69 NEURON 591, 592-93 (2011).
91.
See, e.g., Kevin P. Hill et al., Cannabis and Pain:A Clinical Review, 2.1
CANNABIS & CANNABINOID REs. 96, 99-102 (2017).

&

92.
In 2015, Case & Deaton noticed that the areas that had the highest
overdose rates also had high rates of deaths due to alcohol and suicide. Anne Case
Angus Deaton, Mortality andMorbidity in the 21st Century, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar.
23, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/mortality-and-morbidity-in-the21st-century/. These three deaths of despair were highly correlated with "an
accumulation of pain, distress, and social dysfunction in the lives of working class
whites that took hold as the blue-collar economic heyday of the early 1970s ended,
and continued through the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent slow recovery."
Id.
93.
Economically deprived areas with high unemployment rates often have
high addiction rates. See generally Katherine McLean, "There's Nothing Here":
Deindustrializationas Risk Environment for Overdose, 29 INT'L J. OF DRUG POL'Y
19, 20,22 (2016) (reporting that prescription opioid abuse has become more prevalent
in smaller suburban and rural communities).
Recent studies have shown that opioid misuse is higher for individuals
94.
who report untreated pain as well as untreated chronic mental illness, including
depression. See e.g., Penney, supra note 88.
95.
Although popular discourse makes it appear as if persons who overdose
from opioid addiction are most likely persons who received an opioid prescription
from a doctor for long-term treatment of chronic pain, the empirical evidence to date
does not support this contention. See, e.g., Michael A. Yokell et al., Presentation of
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population is that the policy solutions implemented would benefit
chronic pain patients, but they would not benefit members of the target
population who are not chronic pain patients. NORML, however,
would have come closer to accomplishing its objective by pushing for
the legalization of marijuana incrementally, a political feat much easier
to accomplish than marijuana legalization wholesale. 96
In sum, for pressure groups that are invested in the legislative
adoption of a pet policy solution, beginning by identifying where they
want their narrative to end allows them to reverse-engineer a story that
guides the discourse to their desired solution.
B. Devising a Narrative to Avoid a Solution
Rather than starting the narrative-crafting process with a desired
solution, narrators can also choose the elements of their narrative based
on a desire to eliminate undesirable solutions.
For example,
prescription opioid drug manufacturers, whom some actors have
blamed for causing the opioid epidemic, 97 could hypothetically support
a causal narrative that Chinese manufacturers have flooded the streets
with counterfeit OxyContin and fentanyl, which then caused a spike in
overdoses. Indeed, there is evidence that counterfeit opioids from
Prescriptionand Nonprescription Opioid Overdoses to US Emergency Departments,
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 2034, 2036 (2014) (finding that less than 13% of patients
admitted to U.S. emergency rooms for opioid overdoses had a pain diagnosis).
96.
For an example of attempts to incrementally legalize marijuana, see, for
example, Joel Ebert, With Assist from House Speaker Beth Harwell, Medical
Cannabis Bill Advances in House Subcommittee, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/27/medical-marijuanalaw-tennessee-politics-tn-house/378069002/.
Prescription opioid manufacturers have been blamed for intentionally
97.
downplaying the addictiveness of their products, insisting that their medications last
for 12 hours while possessing evidence that it only lasts for 8 hours. See Alana
Semuels, Are PharmaceuticalCompanies to Blame for the Opioid Epidemic?, THE
ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2017),
https//www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/lawsuit-pharmaceuticalcompanies-opioids/529020/. They have also been blamed for failing to intervene,
even though they knew or should have known that their medication was likely being
diverted. See, e.g., Press Release, Mike DeWine, Ohio Att'y Gen., Attorney General
DeWine Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Distributors for Practices Fueling Opioid
Diversion (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/NewsReleases/February-2018/Attorney-General-DeWine-Files-Lawsuit-Against-Opio.
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China have increased the illicit drug supply in the U.S., 9 8 but other
factors that this narrative ignores have also played a role in the
increased supply and demand of illicit opioids.9 9 By supporting this
causal narrative, U.S. drug manufacturers could shift the blame to
China, making it more likely that any proposed regulations will punish
10
China instead of American pharmaceutical companies.o
C. Devising a Narrative to Support a Causal Theory
Although the first two strategies that this Article outlines
emphasize devising a narrative around a solution, some narrators
devise their narrative with a cause as the focal point. For example,
narrators, like advocacy groups that represent persons in recovery from

98.
Ryan Lucas, Justice DepartmentIndicts 2 Chinese Nationals in Synthetic
Opioid Case, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO
(Oct.
17,
2017,
2:14
PM),
https//www.npr.org/2017/10/17/55833088 1/justice-department-indicts-2-chinesenationals-in-synthetic-opioid-case; Sui-Lee Wee & Javier C. Hernandez, Despite
Trump's Pleas, China's Online Opioid Bazaar Is Booming, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/world/asia/china-opioid-trump.html.
99.
Cf supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying and
campaign contributions).
100.
Such a problem definition has consequences beyond those that the
narrators desire because it encourages punitive solutions. It could, for example, shift
the focus to international interdiction strategies that involve agencies in charge of
foreign affairs. In the past, some presidents have supported the definition of problem
drug use in a manner that blames other countries, particularly other countries that are
less powerful than the U.S. Cf., e.g., WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 48, at 83
(describing 1988 presidential hopeful Michael Dukakis's campaign statement that, if
he was elected, America "won't be doing business with drug-running Panamanian
dictators anymore" as an "attack" on his opponent George H.W. Bush's diplomatic
efforts as Vice President under Ronald Reagan). As commander-in-chief, the
president could then take actions against these countries, showing the electorate that
he is simultaneously involved in foreign affairs and punishing the "bad guys." One
could foresee President Trump supporting such a narrative, as it adds credibility to
his desires to punish China and supports his preferred policy solution of building a
wall at the American-Mexican border to further prevent the smuggling of drugs from
international sources. See, e.g., Matthew Hall, US Turns to Trump Targets-UN,
China and Mexico-for Help in Opioid Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2018, 6:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/07/us-.
American
pharmaceutical companies, however, may or may not have intended each of these
consequences when they devised their hypothetical narrative. These consequences
could be a result of such a narrative all the same.
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addiction, may devise their narratives by starting with the causal story
that addiction is chronic brain disease. These advocacy groups may be
invested in popularizing the causal story that addiction is a disease
because it refutes the stigmatizing causal story that weak character
causes addiction. Further, the chronic-disease analogy communicates
that addiction can recur due to the nature of the disease itself, which
necessarily means that a person's moral character is irrelevant. These
groups may support such a causal story even if they are aware of
evidence that socio-economic factors also contribute to problem drug
use, because they believe that the "addiction is a disease" causal story
is most powerful in combatting social stigma. Even if the "addiction
is a disease" causal story does not align with the best policy results, it
has utility in and of itself. 101
D. Devising a Narrativeto Benefit or Burden a Target Population
Rather than focusing the narrative-design process around
achieving or avoiding a solution or a cause, narrators can also begin
crafting a narrative by choosing the target population, or characters,
that they would like to see receive benefit or blame. Problem drug use
affects many populations. 0 2 Listing all members of a target population
can be not only an exhaustive and likely impossible endeavor, but it
may also confuse the narrative's intended audience, which may have
limited attention and resources. Therefore, in choosing the characters
for their narratives, narrators often choose the segment or segments of
a heterogeneous population that they are most interested in benefiting
or burdening.1 03

See generally, e.g., Julie A. Warren, Defining the Opioid Crisis and the
101.
Limited Role ofthe CriminalJustice System in Resolving It, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 1203
(2018).
See, e.g., CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY,
102.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2016
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES (2017) (Table
6.5 1A, "Illicit Drug Use Disorder in Past Year Among Persons Aged 18 or Older, by
Age First Used Marijuana and Demographic Characteristics: Numbers in Thousands,
2015 and 2016"), https//www.samhsa.gov/datalsites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs2016/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016.pdf.
See SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 84-89 (describing "target
103.
populations" as a "crucial" component of causal stories and policy effectiveness).
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For example, pressure groups can focus on the rural populations
of overdose victims, I" downplaying or ignoring the inner-city victims,
or they could describe opioid-overdose victims as White, not Black, or
10 These
as middle- and upper-class, not poor.o
portrayals only partially
represent the target population of overdose victims, as there are many
poor Black and Hispanic city-dwellers who suffer overdoses. 106 Yet,
in describing the target population, narrators can choose to focus on
only one sub-population as if it represents the entire target population.
Doing so often communicates that this sub-population is the only part
of the population that "should" benefit from the policy solution. This
104.
Moreover, by limiting the focus to overdose victims, narrators include
only recreational drug users and hardcore chronic users who overdose, not those who
do not overdose.
105.
By focusing on a sub-population, narrators can better control the images
and associations that are triggered by the narrative. Cf STONE, supra note 13, at 179
(recounting American Medical Association efforts to organize physicians against the
adoption of Medicaid and Medicare). Similarly, when pressure groups use anecdotes
that describe problem drug use by focusing on an individual who uses, pressure
groups can choose to focus on that individual's membership in one group, while
ignoring their membership in other groups. Society categorizes persons into
populations or groups of actors. Any one actor can be a member of multiple
populations at a time. For example, an overdose victim can be a physician, a father,
and a substance user. As such, each population of actors is comprised of subpopulations of actors (e.g. fathers who are substance users; doctors who are substance
users). And each of these sub-populations is socially constructed to represent
different images in the listeners' mind. The image of a father is quite different from
that of a doctor. Pressure groups can choose to focus on actors' membership in one
population over others, as if that population membership defines the actor. See
SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 84-89; cf STONE, supra note 13, at 170 ("A
person may have needs and problems as a woman (gender), a black (race), a small
business owner (class), and a parent (family status). Numerous political organizations
clamor to represent her and her kind to make her identify her interests in common
with them.").
106.
See Keith Humphreys, Opioid Abuse Started As a Rural Epidemic. It's
Now
a
National
One.,
WASH.
PosT
(July
31,
2017),
https//www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/3 1/opioid-abuse-startedas-a-rural-epidemic-its-now-a-national-one/;
Opioid Overdose Deaths by
Race/Ethnicity,

THE

HENRY

J.

KAISER

FAMILY

FOUND.,

https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/opioid-overdose-deaths-by-raceethnicity/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2018); Haeyoun Park & Matthew Bloch, How the Epidemic of
Drug Overdose Deaths Rippled Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/07/us/drug-overdose-deaths-in-theus.html.

1382

The University ofMemphis Law Review

Vol. 48

is an example of employing a literary technique called
"synecdoche." 0 7
Choosing a sub-population of the target population on which to
Policy
focus has consequences for the policy-making process.
solutions tailored for one sub-population may not be effective for other
sub-populations because the causes of problem drug use in each subpopulation may be different. For example, the causes of marijuana use
among teenagers may be different from the causes of opioid
prescription pain pill abuse by middle-aged White men. 108 The policy
solutions that address problem drug use in these sub-populations
would likely be different as well. A holistic problem definition would
acknowledge the various categories of persons whom problem drug
use affects, acknowledge the multiple causes, and devise an array of
solutions that would address each. Given that drug-policy resources in
the U.S. are both finite and rarely enough to address problem drug use
in a single sub-population, policymakers make choices as to how to
define who benefits or who bears the burden. 1 0 9
Pressure groups can also affect legislators' decisions as to
which sub-population to benefit or burden using such narratives. In
the late 1970s and 80s, addiction treatment providers warned Congress
that persons addicted to cocaine and crack were flooding their
clinics. 1 0 Yet parents' advocacy groups 1 ("Parents Groups") insisted

STONE, supra note 13, at 116-17. Such a technique is useful because
107.
populations have already been socially constructed as having certain attributes and
characteristics, including whether that group is deserving of public assistance. See
infra note 122; see also infra text accompanying notes 122-129.
See, for example, Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, Pub. L.
108.
No. 114-198, § 201(d), 130 Stat. 695, 715 (2016), which provides research grants, in
part, to researchers identifying "unique circumstances" facing teenagers and young
adults struggling with drug use.
109.
See STONE, supra note 13, at 203-05.
MICHAEL MASSING, THE Fix 166-68 (2000).
110.
The Parents Movement arose in the late 1970s out of a greater counter111.
to
revolution what parents viewed was the corruption of societal values by the popular
media that glorified sex and recreational drug use. See generally id. at 143-54.
Parents pointed to parental defiance and recreational drug use as indicators that they
were losing control of their children. Id. at 168-69. The increase in marijuana use
by middle class youth and suburban college students added to their concern, as well
as legislative proposals in Congress to decriminalize marijuana. See generally
MARSHA MANATT, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PARENTS, PEERS, AND POT (1979),
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that the federal government should stop focusing on the "black crack
problem" 112 or reducing the number of "heroin addicts,"1l3 but should
focus instead on teenagers who were experimenting with marijuana.1 14
In defining the drug problem, these Parents Groups focused on youth
as the target population because they wanted youth to benefit from the
policy solutions. However, Parents Groups defined drug users, or
"druggies" as they referred to them, as part of the problem. Parents
Groups blamed druggies for using peer pressure to convince teenagers
to use and, in some cases, supply teens with drugs." 5
To the dismay of Parents Groups at the time, there was little to
no scientific or medical evidence to support their claims that marijuana
was a gateway drug that would lead to a host of evils.11 6 in attempting
to locate such evidence, Marsha Schuchard, an English teacher and cofounder of the Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education
("PRIDE"), contacted Director Robert DuPont of the National Institute
on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") to ask him for help finding such evidence.' 17
In DuPont, Schuchard found an ally and supporter of her narrative.
DuPont even inquired whether Schuchard would be willing to author
a NIDA publication that explained to parents how to prevent teenage
drug use."' She agreed and published two papers with NIDA.11 9
Although NIDA asked her to refrain from drawing medical or
scientific conclusions about marijuana due to her lack of medical or
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EDI 85485.pdf; see also generallyMARSHA MANATT,
NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PARENTS, PEERS, AND POT II: PARENTS IN ACTION

(1983), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED247498.pdf.
112.
MASSING, supra note 110, at 185 (quoting Keith Schuchard, co-founder of
Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education ("PRIDE"), a prominent parents
group).
113.
Id. at 146 (quoting Marsha Schuchard).
114.
Id. PRIDE's argument to convince policy-makers to focus on marijuana
use was that intensive heroin use accounted for 1% of the population, while teenage
gateway drug use affected all of the nation's children. Id.
115.
Id. at 145-46.
116.
The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse had explicitly
stated that there was no scientific evidence that marijuana was a gateway drug. Id. at
151.
117.
Id. at 144.
118.
Id. at 145.
119.
Id. at 152 (discussing MANATT, PARENTS, PEERS, AND POT, supra note
111).
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12 0
Despite her
scientific training, Schuchard ignored these requests.
lack of credentials and the lack of evidence supporting her statements,
12 1
her publications were the most requested NIDA publications.
NIDA's stamp of approval gave the Parents Groups' narrative
credibility, and the Parents Groups' narrative benefited from the
believability that came with focusing on a target population that was
already socially constructed as needing protection and deserving of
policy benefits.1 22 Even before Schuchard's NIDA publications
became available for request, however, the members of the Parents
Groups argued that they were experts because they were parents. For
example, in 1980, when testifying in front of Congress on the potential
health issues that might arise from decriminalizing marijuana, a Parent
Group member explained:

The most important credential I can give you to
substantiate my testimony is that I am a mother, not a
doctor, not a scientist. I am here to protect my children.

Id.
120.
Id. at 153.
121.
Schneider and Ingram theorize that target populations are categorized by
122.
society into two groups: those deserving of public assistance and those who are
undeserving. SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 108. A group's deservingness
is then moderated by the groups political power to create four types of target
populations: Advantaged, Contenders, Dependents and Deviants. Id. Advantaged
groups are groups that society has determined are most deserving and are groups with
the great deal of political power. Id. They include businesses, the middle class, senior
citizens, military, scientists, and family farmers. Id. The Contenders also wield
political power but are viewed as undeserving. Id. They include gun owners, the
rich, CEO's, and savings and loans companies. Id. Politically, it would be unwise to
punish these groups because of their political power, but it would be equally
unpopular with citizens if policy solutions benefited these groups. Dependents are
politically weak but are constructed as deserving and include mothers, children,
persons with disabilities, and the ill. Id. at 109. Because of their social construction,
it is not difficult to construct narratives that call for these groups to benefit. For such
a narrative to be successful, it requires the mobilization of large amounts of
constituents or the endorsement of politically stronger groups. Lastly, the Deviants
are constructed as undeserving and lack political power. Id. at 109-10. They include
criminals and most often hardcore drug users. Id. at 109. The construction of
individuals who use drugs may be changing, however, as they become constructed as
persons with a disease of the brain.
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I am also here to protect my neighbor's children and the
children of this nation.1 2 3
According to policy scholar Michael Massing, by the end of the
Congressional hearing, the possibility of marijuana decriminalization
was dead.' 24 Massing credits the Parents Groups with more than just
the defeat of marijuana decriminalization. In his view, the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, which re-established mandatory minimum
sentences for drug possession, embodied the "parent model of drug
abuse."

25

PRIDE and other Parents Groups demonstrate how pressure
groups can design a policy narrative based on the desire to benefit a
target population. They first centered the narrative composition on
youth as the target population, and they secondarily sought facts to
establish that there was a problem and that the cause of the problem
was marijuana. They utilized their narrative to form coalitions with
school boards, school principals, the Parents Teachers Association
("PTA"), and local churches. 2 6 Maybe most importantly, they found
a high-ranking administrative agency official to support their
narrative.1 27

It is important to note, however, that the Parents Groups'
success in focusing the nation's attention on the sub-population of
youth was costly to the remaining population addicted to illicit
substances, as the latter were more likely to end up in the emergency
room than in treatment. 128 And the government's refusal to pay
attention to the growing number of crack-cocaine users contributed to
the magnitude of the crack-cocaine epidemic that would hit hard in the
late 1980s to early 90S.129
In conclusion, this Section demonstrates theoretically how
narrators can use narratives to limit the alternative legislative solutions

123.
MASSING, supra note 110, at 153 (quoting housewife-turned-antimarijuana activist Joyce Nalepka).
124.
Id.
125.
Id. at 184.
126.
Id. at 151.
127.
They later aligned themselves with Nancy Reagan and played a big role in
the First Lady's anti-drug campaign. Id. at 187-90.
128.
Id. at 153-54, 189-90.
129.
Id. at 190.
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available in the policy discourse and assign benefits and burdens to
target populations. In structuring their causal narratives, narrators can
achieve their desired legislative solutions by strategically choosing a
solution, cause, or target population on which to focus. The order in
which they choose these elements depends on their goals. Narrators
then use these narratives in the problem-definition discourse to
persuade policymakers.
Although there are often multiple problem definitions vying to
be the most dominant, only a few become accepted as the "true"
definitions of the problem. The longer that people accept a problem
definition as true, the more likely it is that the definition becomes
permanently institutionalized. 13 0 Lawmakers create institutions that
implement and enforce policy around the solutions that accompany the
problem definition. The next Part demonstrates that, once lawmakers
create such institutions, it becomes even more difficult to redefine a
problem because these institutions are invested in maintaining the
status quo definition.13 1 As drug policy history demonstrates,
however, it is not impossible to redefine policy problems, especially as
cultural and societal norms evolve and the composition and power of
interest groups change.1 32 The Opioid Epidemic arguably created a
juncture at which the cultural and political environment offer a window
By "institutionalized," I refer to both the behavioral constraints placed on
130.
governmental and societal actions, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 17-26 (1990), as well as the

governmental structure that makes, implements, and enforces the rules and
regulations based on these behavioral patterns and societal constraints.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 55, at 26. For example, as I demonstrate
131.
in Part V, the adoption of a deviance narrative, and implementation of punitive
legislation to address the deviance, has resulted in the allocation of money and
resources to federal, state, and local authorities that enforce the legislation. If activists
were successful in redefining problem drug use as a health issue, the need for such an
enforcement would decrease, as would the number of law enforcement officials
needed and the funding allocated to these institutions. With the allocation of federal
funds to the private prison system in the 1980s, private prisons as well as law
enforcement unions are heavily incentivized to lobby to maintain the status quo. Cf
KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND PUBLIC POLICY

108-09 (1994) (depicting state agencies' incentives and opportunities to shape
policy).
See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supranote 55, at 176 (noting that, out of
132.
98 policy issues studied, researchers found four policy issues that had been
redefined-three of which were only partial redefinitions).
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of opportunity for pressure groups to redefine problem drug use as a
Therefore, exploring historic examples of
public health issue.
pressure-group problem definitions during windows of opportunity for
change may provide us with a better understanding of how to
successfully redefine problem drug use at the current juncture. As
renowned drug policy historian David Musto wrote in reference to the
crack-cocaine epidemic in the late 1980s:
How can we understand this epidemic? It is important
for us to know the history of drug abuse in America if
we are to make wise decisions concerning drug abuse
now and in the future.... When we are in the middle of
a drug crisis, however, we tend to forget this history and
assume that we must face our drug onslaught with no
guideposts. Unaware of how we have overcome past
drug problems, we are liable to panic. 133

V.

THE USE OF HEALTH VS. DEVIANCY NARRATIVES IN DRUG POLICY
HISTORY

Comparing the policymaking process for different pieces of
legislation over time is a difficult endeavor. The factors that affect the
legislative process, including cultural norms, political institutions,
ideologies, and political circumstances, especially vary when
comparing legislative events that occur decades apart. These evolving
factors not only influence the likelihood of legislative enactment of a
policy solution, but also influence the types of causal narratives that
groups use and the way in which they define a problem. 134
Conceding such differences, there is still value in analyzing the
types of narratives that groups have used over time to define a policy
problem, even if it is not for the purpose of proving that pressure
groups' narratives per se caused a legislative outcome. First, political
institutions prefer the status quo, making it more difficult to redefine a
problem the more engrained it becomes. 135 Studying the past use of
narratives to define a problem helps shed light on how such a past may
have influenced how we define a problem today. Second, groups often
133.
134.
135.

MUSTO, supra note 57, at ix.
See STONE, supra note 13, at 153.
See generallyBAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 55, at 29-45.
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recycle causal narratives, as familiar narratives can be more believable
than unfamiliar narratives and may elicit less scrutiny."I Studying the
use of narratives at different junctions of drug policy history helps us
identify the most recycled stories in drug policy. Third, examining
how groups strategically crafted narratives to align with their interests
illuminates how future groups wishing to influence the problemdefinition process can use problem definition strategies. It also
demonstrates how such groups can form alliances around their
narratives. Finally, the following Section also illustrates the powerful
role that administrative agency officials can play in defining problem
drug use.
A.

The Opiate Epidemic & The OpioidEpidemic

At times, society has attributed problem drug use to a disease
or disorder. At other times, narratives blame deviancy or a character
flaw causing problem drug use. Although the policy idea that
addiction is a disease or a health issue may seem new to the policy
discourse, because of its recent resurgence, it emerged in political
discourse as early as the 1800s. Since the "addiction is a disease"
narrative developed during this time period, this analysis begins there.
Examining narrative use to describe an opiate crisis in the midto late 19th century to help illuminate causal stories that could define
the 21st century Opioid Epidemic may seem futile, or even downright
silly. Not only was daily life vastly different in the 1800s, but so were
the federal government's structure and powers. Although the federal
government's powers have grown significantly since the 19th century,
the political parties have evolved, the internal structures of Congress
have changed, and the number of pressure groups involved in the
political process has greatly increased, some definite similarities exist
between the late-19th century opiate crisis and the current Opioid
Epidemic. The target population of both epidemics included a subpopulation of iatrogenic addicts, persons who become addicted to a
habit-forming drug due to a medical error. This sub-population of
iatrogenic addicts includes middle- to upper-class Whites-members

136.

STONE, supra note 13, 148-54.
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of the public that, during both time periods, people viewed as the
mainstream and not associated with the deviant underworld. 137
Aside from the similarities in composition of the target
populations during both epidemics, physicians and pharmacists also
risked blame for causing the 19th century opiate crisis-a causal story
that called for the punishment and regulation of physicians and
pharmacists. The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, discussed further
below, is arguably the prescription monitoring program of the early
Both require reporting, recordkeeping, and the
20th century.'
monitoring of physician and pharmacist prescribing practices. 1 3 9
Adoption of both implies that these professionals need oversight, as
law enforcement agencies used records from both monitoring systems
to punish physicians and pharmacists that appeared to be
overprescribing habit-forming medications. 14 0 During both epidemics,
representatives in Congress made statements supporting the causal
narrative that iatrogenic addiction was a disease that necessitated
treatment. 14 1 Lastly, in both cases, drug manufacturers, pharmacists,
and physicians were active in the problem definition process despite
these groups' lobbying not being a constant feature of American drug
policy. 142
Cf COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 71-72 (describing the atmosphere of
137.
New York opium dens, where, despite smokers' cravings, fistfights and thefts rarely
took place); cf also SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 106-08 (discussing the
social construction of ethnic groups).
Prescription monitoring programs are policy solutions that involve the
138.
state-wide monitoring of habit-forming drug dispensing. See Diversion Control Div.,
State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, U.S. DRUG ENF'T ADMIN.,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/rx-monitor.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
Although prescription monitoring programs are sometimes framed as tools to help
medical professional identify patients that may be drug-seeking, law enforcement can
access the data to aid them in identifying and prosecuting physicians and pharmacists
that are diverting prescription medication. Id.
Compare Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat.
139.
785 (1914) (repealed 1970), with Diversion Control Div., supra note 138.
See generally MusTo, supra note 57, at 54-68, for a historic account
140.
persecution of physicians and pharmacists under the Harrison Tax Act; accord supra
note 138.
Cf supra note 86 (describing how NORML might leverage this narrative).
141.
For example, medical professionals and the pharmaceutical industry did
142.
not consistently lobby on alcohol and drug abuse issues between 1998 and 2017. See
POLS.,
RESPONSIVE
FOR
CTR.
Abuse,
Drug
and
Alcohol
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Due to these similarities, analyzing the types of narratives that
defined the problem of addiction during this early epidemic may prove
more useful than one would have initially predicted.
B. Defining the Nation'sFirst Opiate Epidemic
1. Sub-Populations of the Target Population
By the late 1800s, an opiate epidemic plagued the nation. 14 3 By
the end of the 19th century, an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 persons
had become addicted to drugs.'" The public began to vocalize their
fear of habit-forming drugs, especially when it came to drug use by
Chinese immigrants and Southern Blacks. 145 The majority viewed
these marginalized populations' drug use as a direct threat to White
safety. 146 Further, "opium dens," public places where smokers met to
smoke socially, encouraged undesirable social mixing. 14 7 As the
narrative went, these sub-populations became addicted to opiates and
cocaine because their weak moral characters predisposed them to using
drugs for their euphoric effect. 14 8 Once they became drug users, they
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/issuesum.php?id=ALC
(last visited Nov. 30,
2018).
143.
The estimated number of opiate addicts in the 19th century was between
150,000 to 200,000. STEPHEN KANDALL, SUBSTANCE AND SHADOW: WOMEN AND
ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES

15 (1999). For reference, the U.S. population was

62,979,766.
1890
Fast Facts History, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through the-decades/fastfacts/1890_fastfa
cts.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
144.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 28-34 (discussing late19th and early 20th century efforts to quantify the number of addicts in the United
States).
145.
Id. at 62-81.
146.
Id.
147.
See Joseph F. Spillane, The Road to the HarrisonNarcotics Act: Drugs
and Their Control, 1875-1918, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF
POLICY AND PRACTICE

1, 7-8 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004)

[hereinafter Spillane, Drugs and Their Control].
148.
For a summary of the discourse, see generally, for example, Rebecca
Carroll, Under the Influence: Harry Anslinger's Role in Shaping America's Drug
Policy, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE, 61,
61-91 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) [hereinafter Carroll,
Anslinger's Role].
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posed even more of a threat to society because the drugs increased their
sexual proclivity, criminal behavior, and, in the case of Blacks, their
physical strength.149 The public viewed such a deviant sub-population
of drug users as deserving of punishment, 1 s0 and as a result, these
marginalized populations that were politically weak became most
likely to bear the burden of punitive policy solutions aimed at
decreasing drug use."'1
On the other hand, society "tolerated" iatrogenic addicts, 152 due
in part to their membership in the "'acceptable' segment of the
Most iatrogenic addicts were wives and
mainstream population."'
mothers, two categories of persons that may be politically weak, but
are often socially constructed as deserving of policy benefits.154
Another factor that made iatrogenic addicts more socially tolerable
was the way in which physicians' groups, pharmacists' associations,
and drug manufacturers, which included both patent medicine

See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 94-98; MusTo, supra note 57, at 7.
Carroll,Anslinger's Role, supra note 148, at 62-64, 77-81.
151.
See generally SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 109-10 (outlining
policy solutions often used for politically weak deviant target populations).
Even so, individuals who became addicted to opiates were often ashamed
152.
by their habit and tried to hide it from their loved ones, indicating that there was still
societal disapproval of use even for this class of users. KANDALL, supra note 143, at
3.
See id. at 41; cf SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 108-10
153.
(analyzing types of potential target populations).
154.
Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 5-6.
149.
150.
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manufacturers"ss and self-proclaimed "ethical drug companies"' 5 6
7
(collectively, the "medical industry"), legitimized these addicts' use. '
As the next Section demonstrates, the medical industry's
financial stake in maintaining a customer base within this subpopulation incentivized the industry to support policy narratives that
benefited this subgroup. At the same time, the industry had no
financial incentives to protect the marginalized sub-population of
users. The social construction of these distinct subgroups of drug
addicts, taken with the medical industry's financial interest in retaining
iatrogenic addict customers, ensured that these sub-populations would
be the center of two different policy narratives.
2.

The Medical Industry's Desired Policy Solution

The medical industry had significant financial interest in
ensuring that opiates and cocaine remained licit for medicinal
purposes, because, throughout the 1800s, physicians and pharmacists

Patent medicine manufacturers produced over-the-counter medicines and
155.
tonics, many of which contained morphine, alcohol, and cocaine. Spillane, Drugs
and Their Control, supra note 147, at 4. They were unregulated until the Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1906, which required patent medicine companies to list out
potentially harmful ingredients on its labels. KANDALL, supra note 143, at 23. Prior
to the Act, patent medicine manufacturers lobbied long and hard to remain
unregulated. Id. Patent medicines did not require a doctor's prescription and could
even be purchased via mail order catalogue for rural Americans who did not have
easy access to a pharmacy. Id. at 16. The companies that manufactured patent
medicines advertised heavily in the common periodicals of the time with remedies for
a litany of ailments. Id. at 41. They marketed directly to consumers, highlighting the
benefits for self-medication and downplaying the need for physicians to play the
intermediary between the drug manufacturer and the consumer. Spillane, Drugs and
Their Control, supra note 147, at 4.
Ethical drug companies distinguished themselves from patent-medicine
156.
manufacturers by refusing to market directly to consumers. Id. at 4. Instead, they
marketed to physicians and pharmacies. Id. They also published studies of the
benefits of their medications in their own scholarly journals. Id. at 3.
Id. at 5-10; see also generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 42-53.
157.
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prescribed opiates 1 s8 more often than any other medication. 15 9
Cocaine's medicinal benefits were not widely publicized until the
1880s, but once people learned about them, they also soon hailed
cocaine as a wonder drug that doctors even used to treat opiate
addiction.160 At a time when medicine was not very sophisticated,
opiates, and then cocaine, offered physicians a treatment that worked
and increased the physicians' effectiveness in the eyes of their
patients.1 6 1 Pharmacists also utilized opiates and cocaine in a variety
of ways. Some pharmacists filled physician prescriptions, some
prescribed opiates and cocaine, some used opiates and cocaine in
creating their own elixirs, and some sold over-the-counter patent
medicine.' 62 Both opiates and cocaine were common ingredients in
patent medicine. 163 While ethical drug companies also wanted to
continue producing these drugs, banning these substances would
arguably affect patent medicine manufacturers more than ethical drug
158.
The types of opiates used included opium, morphine and heroin. See
generally KANDALL, supra note 143, at 10-42. Morphine is a derivative of the opium
poppy that was isolated in 1817. Id. The introduction of the hypodermic needle in
1856 made morphine much more accessible. See MICHAEL P. ROTH, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CRIUMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 146-47 (2d ed. 2011);

Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 9. Heroin was invented in 1874
but was not widely marketed until 1898. Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra
note 147, at 9.
159.
More specifically, morphine was commonly prescribed for a variety of
ailments. See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 35-60. At the time
morphine was invented, it was one of the few tools that physicians had at their
disposal that was actually effective. Id. at 46-48. After heroin was invented and
popularized by the German pharmaceutical company Bayer, it was also prescribed,
especially when it was marketed as less addictive than morphine. Spillane, Drugs
and Their Control, supra note 147, at 9. The number of ailments that heroin treated,
however, was fewer than that of mqrphine, so the number of persons who became
iatrogenically addicted to heroin was much lower than morphine addicts.
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 91.

160.
KANDALL, supra note 143, at 33; MUSTO, supra note 57, at 7.
161.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 42-60.
As a profession, pharmacists' political strength was weakened by the
162.
competing interest among sub-specialties. There were disagreements within the
profession as to whether or not they should fight for the ability to prescribe
medication, dispense refills to medications, develop their own medications, and sell
patent medications. Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 4-5;
KANDALL, supra note 143, at 19-23; MUSTO, supra note 57, at 14-15.
163.
Spillane, Drugsand Their Control, supra note 147, at 4.
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companies because patent medicine manufacturers relied heavily on
these drugs as active ingredients in most of their medications-active
ingredients that they did not disclose to their customers until the law
forced them to do so.164

Because of the medicinal uses of opium, morphine, heroin, and
cocaine, drug manufacturers, pharmacists, and physicians actively
lobbied in developing early U.S. drug policy. Aside from their
immediate interest in protecting their access to these "habit forming
drugs,"l6 5 these groups were likely lobbying to secure their position
within the medical industry. Although Congress largely did not
regulate the medical industry, physicians, drug manufacturers, and
pharmacists knew it would only be a matter of time before the federal
government started regulating it, and each group wanted to make sure
that they influenced the legislation that defined which group would
have the authority to make, distribute, and sell medication to
consumers. 166

164.

See generally John P. Swann, The FDA and the Practice of Pharmacy:

Prescription Drug Regulation Before 1968, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE
EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 145, 145-66 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F.
Spillane eds., 2004); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, "Nervine" and Knavery: The Life and
Times ofDr. Miles Medical Company (2007), in ANTITRUST STORiES 61 (Eleanor M.
Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
"Habit forming drugs" was a phrase used in the 19th and early 20th century
165.
to refer to what we now call "narcotics." See, e.g., COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at
135-36.
Physicians and pharmacists were concerned with which group would be
166.
given exclusive control over prescribing and dispensing of medication. Spillane,
Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 5-17; MUsTO, supranote 57, at 13-21.
Both physicians' and pharmacists' groups were in the process of establishing training
standards, licensure requirements, and scope of practice for their respective
professions. See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 13. They were also vying for the right to
be the exclusive prescribers or dispensers of medication. See id.
At the time, physicians' and pharmacists' scope of practice overlapped.
Some pharmacists wrote prescriptions or at least refills for patients without a doctor's
prescriptions. See id. at 18. Some pharmacists dispensed drugs directly to patients,
without physician oversight. Id. at 19. Further, pharmacists were trying to internally
determine their own scope of practice as it related to drug manufacturing and sales,
overlapping at times with patent medicine manufacturers. Some pharmacists sold
patent medicines in their drug stores, while some denounced patent medicine as snake
oils. See id. at 14-15. And still other pharmacists created their own elixirs, competing
in a sense with the patent medicine companies. Id. at 15.
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3. Building a Coalition and Designing a Shared Narrative
Although each of these groups were interested in establishing
exclusivity over at least one part of the manufacturing or distribution
process, their immediate collective need to keep opiates and cocaine
accessible for medicinal use led them to develop a coalition to lobby
Congress on anti-narcotic legislation. There was growing professional
and public awareness that opiates and cocaine were addictive. By the
end of the 19th century, for example, it was difficult for physicians and
pharmacists to deny that opiates and cocaine caused addiction.16 7 To
succeed at convincing Congress to adopt their proposed solution, the
medical industry needed to devise a causal story that resonated with
public sentiment and accounted for the population of iatrogenic
addicts. The American Medical Association ("AMA") and the
American Pharmacists Association ("APhA") had already
acknowledged that the drugs at issue caused addiction.' 6 8 However,
they defined addiction as a disease that developed as an unfortunate
side effect to an effective medical treatment.1 6 9 Physicians had
discretion to decide whether the risk of addiction was worth the benefit
of the treatment.1 7 0 Since addiction was a disease, it logically followed
Pharmacists were not the only competition or threat to the patent medicine
manufacturers. Physicians by and large opposed patent medicine, especially because
patent-medicine manufacturers marketed directly to patients and advocated selfmedication over consulting with a physician. See Spillane, Drugsand Their Control,
supra note 147, at 3-5.
Ethical drug manufacturers saw patent-medicine
manufacturers not only as competition, but as a threat to the credibility of the drug
manufacturing industry. See id. at 4. Ethical drug companies marketed only to
physicians and thought it abhorrent that the patent-medicine manufacturers marketed
directly to consumers. Id. at 3-4. Although one would imagine that physicians would
be allied with ethical drug companies as a result, physicians viewed ethical drug
companies with suspicion, as their business model was evolving to one dominated by
the corporate structure and one that abandoned the traditional model of developing
drugs based on physician demand. See id. at 3. Physicians feared becoming slaves
to ethical drug companies. Id. In sum, although the medical industry allied on some
issues, each group within it was simultaneously struggling to establish its exclusivity
in the medical market.
167.
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 5. Historian David Musto describes physicians'
acceptance of the addictiveness of morphine as "[e]ventual[]" and "gradual." Id.
168.
See id. at 14-18.
169.
Id. at 18-22.
170.
See id.

1396

The University ofMemphis Law Review

Vol. 48

that physicians should have license to use methods such as medicationassisted therapies to treat it."' This definition of legitimacy gave both
professions the added benefit of establishing themselves as the
decision-maker of its legitimacy.
Such a narrative explained iatrogenic addiction and provided a
solution that allowed for the continued medicinal use of opiates and
cocaine. It did not offer a solution that addressed non-iatrogenic
addiction, however, which affected primarily lower-class Whites,
opium smokers, Chinese immigrants, and Blacks. 17 2 To address noncreated
and pharmacists
physicians
addiction,
iatrogenic
1 73
Illegitimate
use.
drug
illegitimate
and
legitimate
for
classifications
drug use, or use of drugs obtained without physician approval,
purportedly had no therapeutic benefit, and addicts used these drugs to
produce euphoric effects.1 74 Under the prevailing view, any addiction
that illegitimate drug use caused resulted from the users' flawed
175
character and desires to over-indulge in hedonistic behavior.
The medical profession continued to make this distinction
between the causes of addiction despite the fact that their leading
biological theory of addiction did not support such a differentiation.
The leading medical theory explaining the biological cause of
addiction, at this time, was the antibody theory, which theorized that
addiction was caused by antibodies forming in the blood that prevented
the user from refraining from drug use.1 7 6 Such a causal theory does
not distinguish between whether or not the user was exposed to the
drug iatrogenically or "illegitimately." Therefore, theoretically, this
medical theory of addiction that the medical community used to justify
a medical approach to treating addiction could have just as easily been
applied to non-iatrogenic addicts. Despite this discrepancy, physicians
and pharmacists continued to offer differing causal theories for
legitimate and illegitimate drug use.
Not only should practitioners have facially applied the medical
theory of addiction to iatrogenic and non-iatrogenic habitual drug use

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supranote 57, at 85-109.
Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 5-10.
Id.
See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 14-23.
Id. at 147.
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equally, but there was no empirical support for the contention that
marginalized populations' drug use made them social deviants. 177
Since non-iatrogenic, habitual drug users were from socio-economic
classes that society relegated to hard labor in the workforce, these
addicts may have been self-medicating for the pain and discomforts of
life, just like their White counterparts."17 Despite the contradictions
and lack of evidence, policymakers may have found the medical
profession's causal stories more believable because their
representations of the target populations were consistent with the
stereotypical images the public had associated with them. Further, the
APhA and the AMA drew on their credentials as experts, which would
add to their narrative's credibility. 179 In sum, distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate use allowed the medical industry to develop
different causal stories for iatrogenic and non-iatrogenic addicts that
accounted for public sentiment and the differing social views that the
public held regarding the various sub-populations of addicts.
4. From Storytelling to Legislating
State and local governments had already begun to pass laws that
regulated the sale or distribution of habit forming drugs, focusing on

177.
If anything, the evidence showed that individuals who committed crimes
prior to their drug use just continued committing crime after their drug use. See
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 7.
178.
Iatrogenic addicts, on the other hand, were mostly Southern White women
who had been prescribed morphine by their doctors to alleviate pain and discomfort
of daily life as a housewife. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 36; KANDALL, supra
note 143, at 14-19. Some scholars believe that morphine use in the Civil War created
a great many iatrogenic addicts. See, e.g., KANDALL, supra note 143, at 19-20.
Historian David Courtwright disputes this claim and argues quite convincingly that
although Civil War soldiers may have been introduced to morphine and gotten a
"taste" for it while fighting in the war, their dosages were quite controlled and it was
unlikely that doctor prescribing practices to soldiers during the war resulted in the
creation of many iatrogenic addicts. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 54-55. Middle
and upper class White women, however, were most likely to seek the care of a
physician for ailments and were therefore the most likely to be prescribed opiates. Id.
at 35-53.
179.
See generally FISCHER, supra note 26, at 177-78 (discussing the use of
professional expertise to add to the credibility of the claims made in a narrative).

1398

The University ofMemphis Law Review

Vol. 48

controlling marginalized populations' drug use. 1s0 As a response, the
APhA proposed a model state law that regulated the dispensing of
opiates and cocaine but allowed for physicians and licensed
81
pharmacists to prescribe the substance for medicinal use.' The APhA
also advocated for the medical maintenance of individuals who had
become addicted.1 82 Effectively, the APhA argued that addiction was
a health issue for iatrogenic addicts. The APhA's model state law also
addressed the problem of "illegitimate drug use"-namely the use of
smoking opium, which both the APhA and AMA agreed had no
medicinal value.18 3 The APhA argued that the states should prohibit
smoking opium and that the federal government should prohibit
importation.1 84 Further, the APhA argued that the entire underclass of
non-iatrogenic addicts, "drug fiend[s]" or "'the demi-monde, known
criminals[,] or those whose occupations are shady' should be totally
85
prohibited" from accessing habit-forming drugs.'
The banning of smoking opium would not affect retail
pharmacists' bottom lines because they sold very little of the
substance. 18 6 The prohibitions also would not affect physicians'
current or future clientele, as non-iatrogenic addicts generally came
87
from socio-economic classes that made them undesirable patients.'
Additionally, since Chinese immigrants primarily used smoking
opium, society would view prohibiting it as a moral victory. "I With
no organized interest group lobbying for the protection of smoking
opium, the drug's association with the criminal underclass, and the
calls from administrative agency officials to regulate the drug, it was
Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 10-14; MUSTO,
180.
supra note 57, at 13-21.
MusTo, supra note 57, at 17-18 (citing the APhA's Committee on the
181.
Acquirement of the Drug Habit, which made recommendations for model laws to be
passed by the states to decrease the likelihood of addiction).
Id. at 18 (citing the APhA's Committee on the Acquirement of the Drug
182.
Habit).
Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note 147, at 5-10; MUSTO, supra
183.
note 57, at 17.
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 14-23.
184.
Id. at 20 (citing the APhA's Committee on the Acquirement of the Drug
185.
Habit).
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 17.
See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 39-40.
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 4, 17.
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of no surprise that smoking opium was the first drug that Congress
prohibited.189 Criminalization is a common solution for a policy
problem that caused by deviant behavior. 190
The medical industry continued its lobbying with its sights set
on Washington. The APhA, with representatives from the AMA and
drug manufacturers, formed a coalition, the National Drug Trade
Conference ("NDTC"), to lobby on antinarcotic legislation at the
federal level.' 9 ' Formalizing this coalition allowed these groups to
present a united front in defining problem drug use. In 1913, members
of Congress proposed legislation, the Harrison Narcotics Act, to tax
the sales of certain habit-forming drugs. 192 By the time the NDTC
finished negotiating with Congress, the bill preserved the AMA and
APhA's ability to prescribe and dispense medication containing habitforming drugs as long as it was for a legitimate medical purpose. 193
The legislation also required the registration of sellers, recordkeeping,
and reporting of sales to the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR").1 94

189.
Municipalities with large concentrations of Chinese immigrants were the
first to pass laws outlawing the smoking of opium, demonstrating the racialization of
certain drug use. Cf COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 52-53 (describing municipal
efforts to restrict the availability of narcotics). In 1909, the federal government
followed suit by passing the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, which banned the
smoking, sale and possession of smoking opium. See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 3-4.
It did not, however, regulate medications containing opium. Members of the
Executive had been pressuring Congress to pass some legislation regulating opium
use to support the U.S.'s condemnation of China for their role in exporting opium.
Id. The U.S.'s leadership involvement in the 1909 Shanghai Opium Conference,
which was convened to address Chinese exportation of opium, and the 1912
International Opium Convention at which the U.S. became a signatory of a treaty
pledging to assist in controlling sale of opiates, necessitated the need for the U.S. to
pass legislation addressing opiate sales or risk appearing hypocritical. Id. at 33.
190.
See SCHNEIDER & INGRAM, supra note 39, at 109-10.
191.
MusTo, supra note 57, at 54-55.
192.
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(repealed 1970).
193.
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 54.
194.
Id. at 35, 59-60. The National Association of Retail Druggists, the
National Association of Medicinal Products, and The American Association of
Pharmaceutical Chemists, the latter two of the three which were drug manufacturers,
also lobbied on anti-narcotic legislation. Id. at 55. Each of these groups also used
narratives that stressed the medicinal value of habit forming drugs and argued that
addiction could be controlled by decreasing illegitimate, or non-medical use. See
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Due in part to the participation of physicians, drug
19 5
manufacturers, and pharmacists in the problem-definition discourse,
the use and possession of morphine, heroin, and cocaine remained licit
96
The medical
for medicinal purposes throughout the early 1900s.1
community benefited from strategically crafting a narrative that
defined iatrogenic addiction as a disease that they were best equipped
to treat, especially since, at the time, this sub-population of drug
addicts were desirable consumers. 19 7 In essence, the medical industry
lobbied Congress to keep these substances licit for medicinal purposes,
while advocating for the punishment of marginalized populations'
illicit or recreational use.
In conclusion, examination of the types of causal narratives that
the medical industry used to describe problem drug use while drug use
was licit at the federal level provides us with some insight as to how
some pressure groups could influence the problem-definition
discourse. In using these causal narratives, the medical industry
advocated for a health definition for at least some target populations,
while advocating for a criminal justice approach for others. The
previous analysis also demonstrates how groups, aided by political and
societal factors, 198 can use causal narratives to pressure Congress into
action or inaction. The next Section demonstrates how administrative

generally id. (containing examples of arguments used by these drug manufacturers in
promoting their objectives).
Of course, it was not only interest group lobbying that prevented the
195.
regulation of opiates during this era. The acceptance of opiate use by the public as
well as the lack of federal regulation of domestic issue in general also played a role.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 42-60.

See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 2.
196.
Id. They were desirable mainly because of their class and their ability to
197.
pay for treatment and medications.
It is important to note that, during this era, the federal bureaucracy was
198.
small and Congress had left much of the regulation of social problems to the local
governments. See THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTuRE
PossIBILrTIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11-13 (1995). The federal government

had not yet established its power to police under the interstate commerce clause. See
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding, nearly thirty years after
enactment of the Harrison Narcotics Act, that Congress has broad power under the
Constitution to regulate economic activity). Thus, the general political atmosphere
would have favored less federal interference and regulation and greater inertia would
have been needed to propel Congress to outlaw drug use in its entirety.

2018

Defining the Opioid Epidemic

1401

agencies took advantage of a window of political opportunity to
capitalize on changes in the public mood to redefine problem drug use
in a way that has dominated for almost a century.
5.

The Role of Administrative Agencies in the Retreat from the
Health Frame

Aside from the State Department's early interest in regulating
opium as a way to participate in worldwide initiatives to prevent the
exportation and trafficking of China's opium, federal administrative
agencies did not concern themselves with early efforts to define
problem drug use. After the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in
1914, however, the stakes changed.
Congress directed the BIR, under Cornell Levis Nutt's
direction, to enforce the Harrison Narcotics Act. 199 Nutt and his
colleagues masterfully capitalized on the nation's fear of deviants to
ensure that Congress generously funded their department.2 0 0 American
troops had just fought the first World War and were fearful of the
"others" that threatened to disrupt the semblance of American life that
they had left behind.2 0 1 Americans did not tolerate addicts whose
inability to contribute to the war effort made them appear unAmerican.2 02 Further, a growing group of reformers during the
Prohibition Era viewed both alcohol and drugs as vices that the law
should prohibit.2 03 Nutt and his colleagues, whom the president
appointed to the Treasury Department's Special Narcotic Committee,
capitalized on the public mood by publishing a report that estimated 1
199.
See Spillane, Drug ControlRegime, supra note 77, at 25. Although there
were early efforts by BIR Commissioner Daniel C. Roper to define addiction as a
medical issue, including his assistance in drafting the France Bill, the window of
opportunity ended as the Republicans gained control of Congress. Id. at 26-27.
Further, the lack of support by his own bureau quelled any hope for BIR support of a
public health solution to addiction. Id. at 27. Once Roper retired, Cornell Levis Nutt
stepped up the rhetoric in defining addiction as a criminal justice issue, ensuring a
law enforcement approach. Id. at 29-30.
200.
See id. at 31-32.
201.
See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 133-34.
202.
Id.
203.
Cf U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, and
transportation" of alcohol and empowering Congress and the States to enforce the
prohibition), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend XXI.
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million addicts in the U.S. by 1919, a figure that they actively
disseminated to the press. 204 This figure added to public fear of this
target population and justified the need for the creation of the Narcotic
Division of the Treasury Department's Prohibition Unit, a division of
the BIR that Congress created at the end of 1919.205 (Of course, even
the BIR later admitted that the figure of 1 million was an
overestimation.) 20 6
The figure justified the creation of the Narcotics Division, a
division that the BIR needed to coordinate their massive efforts to not
only collect taxes and maintain a record of drug sales, but also control
physicians' uses of these medicinal substances-an interpretation of
the Harrison Narcotics Act that many physicians and pharmacists
thought conflicted with Congressional intent. 207 The BIR believed that
the law prohibited the prescription of narcotics to any addict, even for
medication maintenance treatment. The BIR arrested thousands of
physicians and heckled pharmacists over claims that they were
prescribing and dispensing habit-forming drugs in quantities that
exceeded legitimate medical treatment.20 8 It issued regulations giving
itself authority beyond that which the Harrison Narcotics Act expressly
209
outlined, most of which the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional.
Facing the full force of the BIR, the AMA repudiated their
initial support for medication-maintenance treatment in 1920.210
Physicians were targeted for arrest and administrative agencies blamed
physicians in congressional hearing testimony for causing the
addiction epidemic. 2 11 The political costs for continuing to advocate
for narcotic prescription was high, and the payoff was rather low. By
the early 1900s, the population of iatrogenic users that consisted of
middle- and upper-class Whites, had dwindled.2 12 Physician selfSpillane, Drug ControlRegime, supra note 77, at 30-31.
204.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
Id.; MUSTO, supra note 57, at 121-22.
207.
See generally MUSTO, supra note 57, at 121-50.
208.
See generally id. at 121-34. The Supreme Court responded by first
209.
the
BIR's authority and then adding its stamp of approval. See id.
curtailing
Cf at 153 ("The dominant public attitude by 1920 was strong and fearful:
210.
to maintain an addiction was to maintain or create a menacing personality.").
Id. at 134-39.
211.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 110-23.
212.
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education and self-regulation led to a change in physician prescribing
practices of opiates and cocaine.2 13 Further, medical treatment had
evolved with new treatments replacing opiates and cocaine.2 14 The
growing acceptance of the germ theory of disease, as well as vast
improvements in sanitation, decreased the need for drug use. 2 15 Noniatrogenic heroin users, comprised of mostly young urban men who
were associated with the criminal underworld-addicts that neither
society nor the medical industry viewed with the same compassion as
model patients-began to replace iatrogenic addicts. 2 16 They were a
target population that the AMA had no incentive to protect.
So the AMA, which had grown in size and strength, abandoned
the claims that addiction was a disease and distanced itself from
treatment of addiction.2 17 Many of its new members were general
practitioners who were more conservative than their predecessors and
most concerned with federal government intrusion into the practice of
Further,
medicine and the threat of socialized medicine. 218
disagreement grew within the medical community over whether
addiction was indeed a disease. In 1919, researchers falsified the
hypothesis underlying antibody theory, the leading justification for the
"addiction is a disease" narrative, further convincing many physicians
to abandon their claim that addiction was a disease. 2 1 9 Additionally,
physicians were becoming disenchanted by claims that addiction was
curable after studies debunked a series of treatments that purportedly
cured addiction. 2 20 A growing number of physicians began advocating
for addict incarceration to protect both society from the addict and the
addict from himself.22 1

213.

See generally id. at 110-37.

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.

218.

MUSTO, supra note 57, at 200-01.
See Spillane, Drug Control Regime, supra note 77, at 27.
See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 76, 83. Although the antibody theory was

219.
falsified in 1919, even at the height of its support, the theory never had any substantial
evidence or proof supporting it. Spillane, Drug Control Regime, supra note 77, at
27-28.
MUSTO, supra note 57, at 82.
220.
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 134-37.
221.
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When Senator Joseph I. France introduced a bill in the summer
of 1919, which defined addiction as a health issue, called for the use
of Public Health Service ("PHS") hospitals to offer treatment for
addiction, and requested a federal matching funds for all addiction
treatment programs, the AMA withdrew their support for maintenance
treatment and medical treatment for addiction.2 2 2 The AMA was
growing increasingly concerned about the possibility of "government
medicine," or a nationalized health system, and the idea that federally
funded institutions would provide addiction treatment represented to
the AMA just another example of the federal government's increasing
involvement in providing healthcare. 2 23 The AMA further distanced
itself from conversations of addiction, going so far as to repudiate their
previous claims that addiction was a disease. 224 Addiction was not a
disease, claimed the AMA, but a manifestation of repressed
psychological issues.22 5
The PHS had no desire to take responsibility for treating
addicts, so they endorsed the AMA narrative and expanded on it,
claiming that addiction was actually a personality disorder, a type of
psychopathy, one that not only predisposed addicts to drug use but also
to criminal and anti-social behavior. 22 6 There was no cure for
psychopathy, so the PHS advocated for the use of the criminal justice
system to handle this population.2 27 Such a narrative ensured that PHS
hospitals would not have to act as treatment centers for the nation's
population of drug users, a policy solution that they were trying to
avoid.
With physicians and pharmacists under the watchful eye of the
BIR, and the drug manufacturing industry undergoing a fundamental
transformation, 2 28 the coalition of interest groups that supported the

222.
Spillane, Drug ControlRegime, supra note 77, at 27.
223.
Id.
224.
See MUSTO, supra note 57, at 83.
225.
See Spillane, Drug Control Regime, supra note 77, at 28; MusTo, supra
note 57, at 83.
226.
See Spillane, Drug ControlRegime, supra note 77, at 28.
227.
See id.
228.
Ethical drug companies evolved as they took on corporate structure and
invested more in the research and development of new medications that they could
then market to physicians using their own research journals. Spillane, Drugs and
Their Control, supra note 147, at 3. They no longer relied on physicians' demand to
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"addiction is a disease" narrative was no longer interested in
continuing to support such a narrative. The strength with which the
BIR entered the problem-definition discourse and the shift in public
sentiment required these groups to adjust their narrative or their
involvement in drug-policy discourse. This era marked the end of the
dominance of the "addiction is a disease" narrative and the beginning
of the addiction-as-deviance narrative's dominance. Various narrators
would use the deviance narrative over the next thirty years to justify
the creation of additional federal law enforcement agencies that were
invested in portraying the addict as a criminal.

dictate what drugs to make and instead focused on creating new drugs and then
inducing demand by marketing the drug to physicians. Id. Moreover, as physicians
changed their prescribing practices, and the demand for opiates and cocaine
decreased, it is likely that the profit stream from these medications was already
decreasing for drug manufacturers. Further, with the public's growing awareness of
the risks of morphine, heroin, and cocaine, reformers' calls for prohibition of alcohol
and drugs, and physicians' vocal criticism of drug manufacturers incorporatingthereby callously prioritizing profits over patient well-being--continuing to embrace
the narrative that addiction was a mere side effect of a medical treatment would have
been politically risky. Congress signaled its disapproval of drug manufacturers' role
in the opiate epidemic by refraining from holding hearings on the amendments to the
Harrison Narcotics Act to prevent the drug manufacturers, amongst other organized
interests, from watering down the amendments proposed. MusTo, supra note 57, at
136. Further, although losing the revenue from opiate and cocaine sales would not
be pleasant, outlawing the use of opiates and cocaine would also eliminate the greatest
source of revenue for ethical drug companies' largest competitors: the patentmedicine manufacturers. Patent-medicine manufacturers were already experiencing
political and financial turmoil. See Spillane, Drugs and Their Control, supra note
147, at 4-5. They were busy staving off attacks from ethical drug companies and
Physicians lobbied for the regulation of patent-medicine
Id.
physicians.
manufacturers, which they accused of undermining physician authority by marketing
directly to consumers and claiming that public had the tools necessary to treat their
own illnesses by purchasing medication directly from the patent medicine
manufacturers. Id. The passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 marked the
beginning of the end of the reign of the patent-drug companies, as they now had to
label their medication with any potentially harmful ingredients, including cocaine,
alcohol and morphine. See Swann, supra note 164, at 149-50. The requirement that
manufacturers disclose the use of opium, morphine, heroin, alcohol, or cocaine caused
their sales to drop by a third. MusTo, supra note 57, at 22.
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Attempts to Battle Narratives with Numbers

The most politically active federal law enforcement agency in
the problem-definition discourse was the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
("FBN"), founded in 1930 with Harry J. Anslinger as its first
commissioner. 2 29 Anslinger came from the Prohibition Bureau prior
to its dismantling, and he was determined to not let his new bureau
suffer the same fate as the Prohibition Bureau. 23 0 Luckily for
Anslinger, he was a master story-teller who specialized in creating
believable narratives that resonated with public sentiment. He
supported his policy narratives with half-truths, questionable statistics,
and harrowing tales of the perils of drugs use. 231 He was also very
adept at using the media to garner support for his narratives and
regulatory proposals.2 3 2 As faulty as his evidence may have been, he
was convincing, and, throughout his thirty-two-year tenure, Congress
often deferred to his judgment when considering legislative proposals
to address problem drug use.233 For much of his career, Anslinger
argued that drug use was a sign of deviance and that the only suitable
solution for such deviancy was stricter and harsher penalties for drug
users and drug traffickers.2 34 "'The addict,' he claimed, 'is like a
typhoid carrier; he will spread crime and disease wherever he goes. He
will spread addiction."' 235 The policy solutions that aligned with such
a narrative included the confinement of the addict to protect society.
This causal story eliminated the possibility of medical-maintenance or
medical-assisted therapies as a policy solution, which Anslinger was
also clear to explicitly denounce. 2 36 "The idea of the government
poisoning its citizens with narcotics is nonsense. Why don't they set

229.
Carroll,Anslinger's Role, supra note 148, at 61.
230.
Id. at 64.
231.
Id. at 66.
232.
Id. at 70-73.
233.
Id. at 61, 66.
234.
Id. at 61.
235.
Rebecca Carroll, The Narcotic Act Triggers the Great Nondebate:
Treatment Loses to Punishment, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF
POLICY AND PRACTICE 101, 129 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004)
(quoting Aslinger from a 1959 interview on the Monitortelevision show) [hereinafter
Carroll, The GreatNondebate].
236.
Id. at 127.
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up bar rooms for alcoholics . . . ? Why not furnish everybody with
what they want, bullets, or department stores for kleptomaniacs, and
so on." 237
Anslinger presented anecdotes and "fabricated horror stories
connecting drug use with violent crime" as testimony in several
congressional hearings, and they "weighed heavily" in Congress's
decision to enact major narcotics legislation, including the Boggs Act
of 1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 ("NCA"). 23 8 By 1956,
Anslinger had accomplished his goals of persuading Congress to pass
legislation requiring stiff mandatory minimum sentencing for
possession and drug sale.239 The NCA even allowed for the jury to
recommend the death penalty for a conviction of drug sales to a
minor.24 As rhetoric expert Dr. Rebecca Carroll put it, "After twentysix years, Anslinger was the recognized authority on narcotics. By
controlling the discussion on narcotics, Anslinger controlled the policy
on narcotics."241

Not until mandatory minimums became a reality did organized
interest groups make a concentrated effort to publicly challenge the
legitimacy of the United States' criminal-justice approach to the
nation's drug problems or attempt to redefine the problem of addiction
as a medical disease. The American Bar Association ("ABA") and the
AMA led the way in the attempt to redefine addiction as a health issue
by testifying at congressional hearings and forming a formal, joint
committee to study narcotic drugs. 242 The ABA-AMA Committee
hoped that their research would add credence to their criticisms of the
United States' criminal-justice approach to addiction and would open
up a dialogue between the Committee, the Narcotics Bureau, and

Id. (quoting Aslinger from a 1959 interview on the Monitor television
237.
show) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238.
Id. at 66.
Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 728, § 103, 70 Stat. 567, 568239.
69 (1956).
240.
Id. § 107.
Caroll, The GreatNondebate, supra note 235, at 112.
241.
Id. at 112-13.
242.
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Congress regarding alternative legislative solutions for the drug
problem. 243
Instead, it enraged Anslinger, who wrote them letters
dismissing the evidence in their 1958 Interim Report 2" as inconsistent
and lacking in factual accuracy. 24 Anslinger refused the Committee's
multiple requests to meet and used the media to communicate his
disgust for the Interim Report.24 6 Later that year, the FBN released
official Comments on the Narcotic Drug Interim Report of the ABAAMA, a compilation of previously published and new articles that
supported the FBN's narratives-none of which directly addressed the
claims made in the Interim Report. 2 47 The FBN, under Anslinger's
direction, did what it did best: battle the evidence with narratives. The
ABA-AMA released their final report in 1961, which they titled "Drug
Addiction, Crime or Disease?" 24 8 However, as Rufus King, one of the
authors of the report, later wrote in his book The Drug Hang-Up,
"ABA-AMA, No Match for HJA." 2 49
Although the ABA-AMA tried to redefine addiction as a
disease, they did not have a high-ranking government official
supporting their narrative. Rather, a high ranking administrative
officer who had established himself as a narcotics expert directly
The Committee was especially interested in exploring the expansion of
243.
medication-assisted treatments. See id. at 113-14 (contrasting the health and criminal
approaches to addiction and drug-related crimes).
244.
The report summarized the two approaches to addressing problem drug
use: the punitive approach and the health approach. See generally DRUG ADDICTION:
CRIME OF DISEASE? INTERIM AND FINAL REPORTS OF THE JOINT COMM. OF THE AM.
BAR Ass'N AND THE AM. MED. Asss'N ON NARCOTIC DRUGS (1961) [hereinafter

ABA-AMA], http://bit.ly/2Q8MGw7. It advocated that the federal government fund
an experimental pilot program that prescribed opioids on an outpatient basis as
treatment for addiction. Id. at 11. The report included a detailed appendix outlining
Britain's approach to treating addiction, a harm reduction approach that favored
MAT. Id. at 121-53.
245.
Carroll, The Great Nondebate, supra note 235, at 116.
246.
Id. at 115-16.
See generally ADVISORY COMM. TO THE FED. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS,
247.
COMMENTS ON NARCOTIC DRUGS: INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ON
NARCOTIC

DRUGS (1959); see also Caroll, The Great Nondebate, supra note 235, at

120.
248.
249.

ABA-AMA, supra note 244, at 159-66.
Carroll, The GreatNondebate, supra note 235, at 130.
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opposed their narrative.25 0 Aside from not having the necessary
support from an official-support that Baumgartner, et al., argue is an
important predictor of successful problem redefmition 2 5 1-the ABAAMA made an erroneous assumption: gathering scientific or empirical
evidence to support claims and arguments was necessary to refute the
dominant deviance narrative. Essentially, they brought facts to a battle
of narratives.
After all, Anslinger's dominance in the drug policy discourse
did not result from his use of "facts" or scientific evidence to support
his arguments. Anslinger invested his energy in telling a compelling
narrative that resonated with his audience and legislators who were
interested in assuaging their constituents' fears. His narratives were
consistent, his description of the target population elicited images that
made his solutions more persuasive, and he artfully utilized the media
to communicate his narrative. The ABA-AMA Committee, on the
other hand, did not produce enough copies of the Interim Report for
mass circulation, and they ran out of copies soon after it was
published.25 2 Initially, they printed enough copies to provide copies to
the FBN and some ABA and AMA members for review, but the
Committee wanted to make sure that the Interim Report was factually
accurate and approved by the Board before copies got into the hands
of the media, libraries, schools, and even all of the members of the
ABA and AMA.253 This decision allowed Anslinger to control the
discourse by criticizing the Interim Report in the media, when few had
the opportunity to read the Interim Report for themselves.2 5 4 Further,
Anslinger insisted that the FBN widely circulate its Comments to the
Interim Report as soon as it published them in 1958, making sure to
send copies to the media, 2 5 5 while the ABA-AMA Interim Report did

See generally Carroll, Anslinger's Role, supra note 148.
Cf BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 55, at 77-78 (describing challenges
that advocates face when they lack a champion in a legislative body, or there is an
opponent in the legislative body).
See Caroll, The GreatNondebate, supra note 235, at 116-18.
252.
Id. at 117-18.
253.
See id. at 120-29.
254.
255.
Id. at 120. King argued that the FBN purposely made their publication
appear similar to the Interim Report by printing it on the same colored paper and
formatting the cover similarly in an effort to confuse readers into thinking that they
were reading the Interim Report and not the comments to it. Id. at 122-24.
250.

251.
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not become widely distributed until 1961 as an attachment to the Final
Report.2 5 6 By the time the report was available, the public had already
made their judgments. Anslinger understood that the key to success
was to ensure that the FBN narrative dominated, while the ABA-AMA
was more concerned with ensuring that they had their facts straighteven if it meant delaying its reports' entrances into the discourse. As
well-researched as the Interim and Final Reports may have been,
policymakers dismissed them even before they became widely
available to the public, and with their dismissal, the efforts to redefine
"addiction" as a disease died. In the policymaking process, evidence
is only one input into the decision-making process and, in this case, it
was no substitute for a well-crafted narrative.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED: CONCLUDING REMARKS

As legal scholars, we devote many of our printed words to
analyzing legislation that has been enacted or proposed. We propose
"better" legislative proposals or argue that current proposals or enacted
legislation are inadequate. Little legal scholarship analyzes or suggests
how to enact model legislative solutions. In the academy, we place so
much emphasis on the numbers, the facts, and the evidence, as if the
side with the best evidence and the most publications in the highestranked journals wins. If one's goal is to contribute to the policymaking
process, however, to help policymakers reform our ineffective and
costly criminal-justice approach to problem drug use and replace it
with any one of the model health-oriented drug policies that many
developed nations have effectively implemented, then compiling more
evidence will not help us reach our objective. The existence of
evidence alone does not change policy. The AMA and ABA had
sufficient evidence to support their policy position, yet Harry
Anslinger silenced them with his narrative. Arguably, the AMA was
more successful in achieving their objectives in the late 1800s and
early 1900s, when they had little evidence to support their narrative
that addiction was a disease, than they were when they had a wellresearched and documented report in the late 1950s. As groups like
the Parents Groups of the 1970s and 1980s have shown us, power lies
in the narrative.

256.

Id. at 125.
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Although narratives may trump evidence, there is still strength
in numbers in the sense that more voices in unison are stronger than a
single voice. The coalitions that have formed around common
narratives throughout drug-policy history have shown us that the more
narrators that tell the same story, the more likely that the narrative will
dominate the policy discourse. In each instance groups had choices or
alternatives as to how they wanted to craft their narrative, yet each
compelling narrative had some commonalities. They each drew from
cultural norms and beliefs in order to make their narratives believable.
Their descriptions of their characters coincided with their populations'
social construction.
And their causal theory aligned with the
population they wished to benefit and the solution they supported. Not
only did these groups have commonalities in their narrative structure,
they also shared an understanding of the power of narratives in the
policy-making process. They used their narratives to persuade other
groups, legislators, and even high-ranking administrative officials to
support their causal explanations and their policy proposals.
Concerned citizens, including legal scholars, have at their
disposal several strategies that they can use to take advantage of the
current window of opportunity that bi-partisan and public support for
the addiction-as-a-disease narrative has created. Since a plethora of
evidence supporting the efficacy of a health-oriented approach already
exists,2 5 7 proponents of the public-health approach can focus their
efforts on affecting the policymaking process by using some of the
strategies that this Article outlines. Namely, proponents can begin by
(1) identifying preferred public health solutions, (2) strategically
crafting a compelling policy narrative that aligns with the desired
public health solutions and accounts for cultural norms and beliefs, (3)
forming coalitions with other proponents that support the narrative and
its aligning solutions, and (4) using the narrative to persuade highranking government officials in both the executive and the legislature
to support public-health solutions.
Moreover, advocates for the public-health approach will need
to broaden the problem definition of the Opioid Epidemic specifically,
and problem drug use in general, to address sufficiently current and
257.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 57, at 165-74 (describing federal
health-related efforts to curb drug use and addiction in the 1960s and 70s); MASSING,
supra note 110, at 271-75; MusTO, supra note 57, 230-43; YSA ET AL., supra note 4,
at 42-43 (describing EU member nations' efforts to combat drug addiction).
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future problem drug use. For example, as with other health outcomes,
the social determinants of health influence addiction and overdose
death rates.2 58 If advocates support a policy narrative that attributes
problem drug use, at least in part, to social, economic, and
environmental factors, a multi-modal public health oriented solution
will have a greater likelihood for political success. Such a narrative
does not negate the "addiction is a disease" narrative, but rather builds
on it to focus on both treatment and establishing a system of supports
that ensures the greatest likelihood for lifelong treatment success.
Advocates can add to the credibility of such a narrative by pointing to
the evidence that demonstrates that such multi-modal approaches are
not only more effective, but are also more cost-effective in the long
term.259
Since legal professionals and legal scholars are already
predisposed to seeking policy change through the judicial system, this
Article has focused on another avenue by which legal scholars and
professionals can contribute to the problem-definition discourse and
influence policy outcomes-the legislative process. Although this
manuscript focuses on affecting the legislative process, narrators can
apply the problem definition strategies it presents to the
implementation and interpretation phases of policy-making.
Moreover, although this discussion focuses on the issue of problem
drug use, pressure groups can apply these strategies to other issues,
like gun violence, for which groups desire to redefine the problem and
effect policy change.
For a multi-modal public health approach to become a
legislative staple in American policy, advocates of such an approach
must learn from the failures and successes of past organized interest
groups and focus on building a dominant and compelling narrative to
supplement existing scientific evidence and seek support for such a
narrative from coalitions and high-ranking government officials. After

Cf ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 203 (discussing the correlation
258.
between socioeconomic status and harms from problem drug use).
See generally YSA ET AL., supra note 4 (providing recent experiences and
259.
efforts from Europe).
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all, it is not the evidence, but the problem redefinition and its
accompanying narratives that drive policy change. 260

&

260.
David A. Rochefort & Roger W. Cobb, Preface to THE POLITICS OF
PROBLEM DEFINITION: SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA vii (David A. Rochefort
Roger W. Cobb eds., 1994); STONE, supra note 13, 160-65.

